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Data from the 1999-2001 World Values Survey (WVS), the Environmental
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Human behaviors have had a devastating impact on the condition of the natural
environment. Pollution has led to a decline in the health of humans as well as for a
variety of flora and fauna. The continued devastation of the land through over harvesting
of natural resources, poor mining practices, and a host of other means has led to a decline
in the potential quality of life for current and future generations. Many individuals,
groups, nations, and larger inter-governmental organizations have made efforts to end
such shortsighted practices. Some of these efforts have been relatively successful, while
others have not. Unfortunately, even the best efforts of individuals, groups, or nations are
often ineffective if other individuals, groups, or nations fail to make positive effort to
reduce the human footprint on the planet.
Of the major environmental problems, those related to air pollution seem to get
most of the attention. There may be a good reason for the attention, as the World Health
Organization (2006) estimates that about 2 million deaths occur worldwide on an annual
basis due directly to air pollution. Some of these pollutants, called “greenhouse gases”
allow sunlight to pass through, but prevent infrared radiation (heat) from escaping the
earth’s atmosphere. The result is typically called the “greenhouse effect” in that it
operates in much the same way as a greenhouse, by causing the temperature of the earth
to increase. The outcome of the “greenhouse effect” is an increase in the average surface
temperature of the earth. There exists some controversy about whether the greenhouse
effect is actually causing the changes in temperature it has been reported to, but
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according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2002; 2007) the evidence
is clear.
Other types of environmental problems are important as well, though many of
them are given much less attention than global warming. One example is water pollution.
Freshwater scarcity is already a big problem in many parts of the world, and is likely to
become one of the most pressing issues of the 21st century (World Resources Institute
1998). Estimates indicate that in the mid-1990s, about 40% of the world’s population was
already suffering from severe water shortages (United Nations Environment Programme
2002). The primary causes of such shortages are population growth, increases in irrigated
agriculture, and industrial development.
In addition to pollution in the water and air, even our soil is experiencing
degradation. By 1990 agricultural practices had degraded 562 million hectares of the
world’s cropland (Oldeman 1994). This represents about 38% of the earths original 1.5
billion hectares of cropland. The major causes of land degradation include poor
agricultural practices (overgrazing, over cultivation, water logging, and salinization),
mining, fire, development, and deforestation. Approximately half of the forests that
existed on earth when humans first began to practice agriculture are gone. Between 1980
and 1995, an area the size of Mexico was lost to logging, fire, and development (Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 1997).
There are many causes of these environmental problems, but most of them are of
concern specifically because of the human component of the problems. Population
growth plays an important role in the causes of these problems, and even more
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importantly on the intensity with which they affect us. Technology can be important for
solving many of these problems, though it can surely be implicated in causing some of
them as well. Fossil fuel that is burned to power automobiles, trucks, and buses
contributes to air pollution. In fact, the pollution from cars in Austria, France, and
Switzerland caused more deaths than those resulting from automobile accidents (Reaney
1999). Another problem that comes with technology has to do with the disposal of the
components of that technology. Besides the problem of disposing of car tires, toxic fluids,
and plastics, many technological devices contain hazardous waste like mercury and lead,
which can be deadly if disposed of improperly.
The evidence is clear that environmental degradation continues to have severe
negative effects on the planet and its inhabitants. Though attitudes and behaviors are
rarely perfectly correlated with each other, having an understanding of these problems,
and being concerned about them are essential in promoting efforts to change them. There
has been much research focused on the conditions in which people develop concern for
the environment, and a desire to behave in an environmentally responsible manner. Thus
far, much of this research has focused on the individual, primarily through social surveys.
The knowledge gained from this research has been useful in developing a better
understanding of the demographic, social, and cultural conditions related to concern and
environmental attitudes. Other studies have focused instead on the structure of nations in
order to discover how the social structures of a nation impact the environment. This
suggests that there are structural variations between societies when we compare them
from a macro-perspective. The purpose of the present study is to examine the combined

5

roles of the factors operating at both the individual level and the national level in the
formation of environmental concern and environmental attitudes.
In order to understand the reasons for more social change in some areas compared
to others, we must examine both the individual and national-level factors that contribute
to environmental attitudes. Environmental sociologists have developed a large and wideranging body of literature on the topic of environmental concern (Dunlap et al. 2000). In
much of this research, concern for the environment has been treated as a significant
predictor of environmental behaviors.
Unfortunately, tests of theories to explain variation in environmental attitudes
have not been very successful at explaining where and when positive change in the
human-environment relationship will occur. My argument is that this failure is primarily
because past studies have not simultaneously included both individual-level and nationallevel factors in the analyses. Researchers have examined specific demographic and
cultural factors such as: age (Jones and Dunlap 1992), race (Mohai 1980; Mohai and
Bryant 1998), political orientations—whether one is politically liberal or conservative
(Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), religious beliefs (Sherkat and Ellison 2007; Greeley 1993),
gender (Mohai 1992), education (Jones and Dunlap 1992), and income (Van Liere and
Dunlap 1980) , while others have examined more structural types of factors such as
political structure, economic system, and the availability of certain types of
infrastructure—recycling centers, for instance (Schultz and Oskamp 1996). These
strategies have both had limited success in the understanding of human attitudes about
the environment.
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While researchers have, to varying degrees, noted the value of examining
individual or structural factors influencing environmental attitudes, they have not
attempted to combine both types of factors into their analyses in any meaningful way. In
the following chapters, I examine the confluence of individual and national-level factors
which influence both national- and individual-level environmental attitudes. I will use
several statistical techniques in order to examine both individual-level and national-level
characteristics separately as well as combined.
Many researchers have examined the relationship between attitudes and
behaviors. This body of research is important in that we often assume that by attempting
to understand attitudes we are implicitly somehow able to understand corresponding
behaviors. While in some instances this may be true, the literature on the attitudebehavior relationship makes no attempt to claim that this is true in all instances. Some
research of note in this area has suggested that attitudes do not predict behavior, but they
can predict the intention to behave in a certain way (Ajzen 1985; Ajzen and Fishbein
1980; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Fishbein 1967). Intentions may not always predict
behaviors, however, due to a variety of structural constraints that may exist in a given
situation (Stets and Biga 2003). For example, even when we would like to recycle in an
effort to reduce household waste, if the infrastructure, opportunity, or financial resources
required to recycle are not available, we are not likely to do so (Oskamp and Schultz
1996).
It is therefore important to study both individual and national levels of proenvironmental attitudes, but it is also necessary to examine individual and structural
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factors that may influence these attitudes. In other words, individual-level characteristics
have more of an effect on the attitudes of individuals, and structural factors have more of
an effect on the attitudes of aggregate levels of these individuals. For example, some
research has noted that people with certain political affiliations often have higher levels
of environmental concern (Dunlap 1975). While this may be helpful when we look at the
individual, many of the challenges we face with regards to the environment require not
only a change in the attitudes of individuals, but also changes at the national level. With
the exception of several world-systems researchers (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Chew
1997; Burns, Davis, and Kick 1997; Bartley and Bergesen 1997), it seems that many
environmental social scientists have not come to terms with this reality.
By simultaneously assessing individual and national-level predictors of
environmental attitudes—whether one has a generally positive or negative view of the
human-environment relationship—we not only gain a more complete understanding of
the human-environment relationship, but also a more complete understanding of the
sources of influence and their impacts on both individual and aggregate levels of
environmental attitudes. Building on past studies that focus only on individuals or only
on structures, my goal is to provide an integrated individual and national-level model of
environmental attitudes.
To accomplish such a task, I use a variety of techniques. Indeed these tools will
be specific to each of three tasks necessary for this undertaking. While each particular
analysis will be useful on its own, only by examining the results of all three analyses in
context can the bigger questions be properly answered.
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In Chapter 2, I review the theoretical and substantive literature on environmental
attitudes, post-materialism, and the world-systems perspective. In examining
environmental attitudes at the individual level, I review the literature on the New
Ecological Paradigm and post-materialism. In examining environmental attitudes at the
national level, I incorporate the world-systems perspective and examine the literature
both broadly and in greater detail by examining its origins and applications, as well as its
specific application to the issue of environmental degradation. Lastly, I frame the three
studies in Chapters 3-5 in the context of post-materialism and the world-systems
perspective.
In Chapter 3, I examine individual environmental attitudes in a cross-national
context. The examination of individuals in this context allows for a clearer picture of the
variety of factors associated with environmental attitudes. Also, the nature of crossnational analyses allows one to gain a more complete understanding of the undoubtedly
complex relationships between the many individual-level characteristics that contribute to
pro-environmental attitudes. Another advantage of this technique is that it gives us a
picture of the variation between different nations. In order to accomplish this, I use
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and logistic regression techniques, as well as other uniand multi-variate statistical methods. The data comes from the 1999-2001 World Values
Survey.
In Chapter 4, I focus on assessing the national-level factors that affect aggregate
environmental attitudes. This analysis is necessary in order to complete the analysis in
Chapter 5. However because there are a variety of different factors that have been
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examined in previous research, it is also required in order to examine the variety of
potential variables involved. Understanding the structural factors that may influence proenvironmental attitudes is important because it allows for a more complete picture of
various aspects of life in a given nation that may help or hinder the development of proenvironmental behaviors. In order to accomplish this, I use aggregated data from the
1999-2001 World Values Survey, as well as national-level data from the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI). I use a
variety of uni- and multi-variate statistical techniques to examine the national differences
in environmental attitudes. This allows me to more easily discern how structural
constraints and national-level characteristics influence aggregate levels of environmental
attitudes.
In Chapter 5, I examine the dual influences of individual characteristics and
national-level factors on individual environmental attitudes. This third analysis combines
the analyses from the individual-level analysis (Chapter 3) and the national-level analysis
(Chapter 4) by combining the separate individual and national-level factors into a
multilevel model. In order to accomplish this, I have created Hierarchical Linear Models
in which the level 1 (individual-level) variables are the individual factors as examined in
Chapter 3, and the level 2 (national-level) variables are the national-level characteristics
examined in Chapter 4. The most significant contribution that comes from this analysis is
a formalized model of the individual and national-level factors that are necessary for
understanding environmental attitudes within and between countries. Put differently, I
assess whether national-level differences in environmental attitudes stem from the
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characteristics of the nation and its relationship to other nations, or from the
characteristics of individuals within the nation.
In Chapter 6, I conclude by reviewing and discussing the findings of each study,
as well as placing them in the context of the world-systems perspective, post-materialism,
and the New Ecological Paradigm. I also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this
research and assess potential future directions for this research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
The world-systems perspective (Chase-Dunn 1989; Wallerstein 2000) has been
widely used in environmental sociology. Past research, however, has tended to focus
solely on macro-level characteristics of nations. While environmental sociologists have
looked at environmental problems in both macro- and micro- contexts, they have not
attempted to examine environmental issues from both levels simultaneously.
The research presented here examines environmental attitudes at both macro- and
micro- levels. In an individual-level approach, such as Dunlap et al.’s (2000) New
Ecological Paradigm (NEP), researchers have found that pro-environmental attitudes
have become more common across the social spectrum in recent decades. While the
originators of the NEP concept make no concrete claims about the reasoning behind such
a trend, it has been suggested by others that the trend is due to the availability of
information regarding the types of environmental problems we face both in the local
context, but also in the global context (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Additionally, the postmaterialist perspective, shares many similarities with the NEP. First, both view the
increase in environmentalism as a response to a generational shift in social attitudes.
Finally, both generally focus on individual attitudes, though post-materialism research
often incorporates national level attributes. The NEP suggests that environmental
attitudes should be relatively consistent across social classes, whereas the post-materialist
thesis suggests that environmental attitudes should be stronger among the higher social
classes.
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Building on these approaches, the world-systems perspective (WSP), views the
condition of the natural environment as an unfortunate casualty of the development,
growth, and spread of the singular capitalist world-system, and the various structural
factors that are dependent upon such an arrangement. As such, individual level
environmental attitudes are formed not only by the social and demographic
characteristics of the individual, but also by the contextual environment in which they
live.
In this chapter, I describe these perspectives with respect to their relationship to
one another and to the environment. Additionally, the research objectives of the present
study are explained within the context of the world-systems perspective, post-materialism
and the NEP.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
Concern for the environment and public knowledge of environmental problems
are necessary to begin to solve environmental challenges. Because many environmental
problems were caused by human activities, human behavior is required to solve them.
Researchers studying environmental behavior have rarely examined the relationship
between attitudes and behavior in any direct context. Instead, they have examined various
aspects of the behaviors themselves, such as examining recycling as a function of the
effort required by individuals (Schultz and Oskamp 1996), or by examining the outcomes
of elections in terms of the similarity between the voters and the candidates’ views
regarding the environment (Gill, Crosby, and Taylor 1986). Others have adopted various
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mostly psychologically focused theoretical frameworks to explain human behavior that
contributes to environmental problems, rarely identifying the social components of
environmental problems. My goal is to understand both individual and national-level
characteristics associated with environmental attitudes. I assume that environmental
attitudes should, at least indirectly be associated with environmentally friendly behavior.
In the last few decades there has been a significant increase in interest among
Americans on the state of the natural environment (Bell 2004; Kalafatis, Pollard, East and
Tsogas 1999; Krause 1993; Ottoman, Stafford, and Hartman 2006). Especially in recent
years, even advertisers have exhibited some change towards greener tactics (Pujari and
Wright 1995). This change does not necessarily reflect a higher level of environmental
awareness, as suggested by Peattie and Crane (2005), though it does play an important
role in the level of exposure of certain populations to this issue. Yet the relationship
between awareness of the problem and acting on potential solutions has not been
sufficiently examined. In other words, even though there appears to be a steady upward
trend in environmental consciousness (Kalafatis et al. 1999) and an overall increase in
awareness of the potential solutions to these problems, little is known about why some
people are acting “green” while others are not. Because macro- and micro- approaches to
this question have only been marginally useful, a new approach is required.
The New Environmental Paradigm (also referred to as the “paradigm shift thesis,”
the “alternative environmental paradigm,” or the “ecological social paradigm”) is, put
simply, a theory about paradigm change. The NEP proposes, in contrast to the post-
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materialist view that only the wealthy are concerned about the environment (Inglehart
1995). According to Bell, the NEP can be explained as follows (2009:173):
Rather than seeing environmentalism as an affectation of the comfortable, this
theory suggests that in response to discrepancies between evidence of
environmental threats and ideologies that do not consider environmental
implications, people are slowly but steadily adopting a more environmentally
aware view of the world.
In other words, people, regardless of background no longer see themselves as exempt
from the environmental implications of their behaviors. This represents an important
change from the previous belief that human behavior was not directly responsible for
environmental problems. Researchers using the NEP have argued that what the theory is
intended to examine is the process in which people’s values about the environment catch
up with their beliefs about it (Bell 2009). From this, one can assume no differences in
environmental attitudes among social classes or income levels.
This view should be seen in contrast to competing perspectives regarding the
nature of environmental concern. The Human Exemptionalism Paradigm (HEP)
(alternatively, the “dominant social paradigm,” or the “technological social paradigm”),
suggests that humans are “exceptional creatures who are able to overcome environmental
limits,” and are therefore exempt from the rules which apply to all other beings on earth
(Bell 2009: 174). Additionally, because humans are capable of developing such high
levels of technology, they are able to master nature. An example of this view is apparent
when one considers the use of dams in order to store, re-route, or stop water in order to
benefit human societies, regardless of the consequences to wildlife and ecosystems.
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Another useful perspective is the post-materialism thesis. This thesis applies
much more broadly than just the environment and attitudes towards it, and is intended to
suggest that a shift has taken place between materialist and post-materialist values.
Inglehart (1995; among others) argues that newer generations are less concerned with
“economic and physical security” issues (material values) and are more concerned with
“freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life” (post-material values). Specifically,
those with more wealth, or higher social class should have higher pro-environmental
attitudes.
Ingelhart (1981) describes the concept of post-materialism as a shift in values
with two central hypotheses. First, “a scarcity hypothesis,” proposes that people are most
concerned about those things which are in short supply. For instance, as in economics,
people generally value those things which they see as the most central to their immediate
survival, particularly when those things are in short supply. This includes food, clothing,
shelter, and water. Second, “a socialization hypothesis,” which proposes that a shift in
values from materialist (concerned mainly with survival) to post-materialist (concerned
with higher-order values) is a process of socialization and as such, it responds slowly to
changes. Based on this perspective, one should expect to observe higher proenvironmental attitudes among wealthier and more educated people, and also, relatively
consistent findings among populations who have shared in this process of socialization.
International survey responses suggest that according to respondents, the goals of
various countries have shifted from “maintaining order in the nation,” and “fighting
rising prices” (materialist responses) to “giving people more say in important government
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decisions,” and “protection of freedom of speech,” (post-materialist responses)
suggesting that such a shift has some empirical support (Bell 2009:172). Ingelhart argues
that concern for the environment is another post-materialist value, and as such, we should
expect to see that only wealthier respondents would be concerned about it. Other studies
have also found correlations as high as r = .79 between income (GDP per capita) and
environmental concern, suggesting that the wealth of a nation is extremely important in
explaining pro-environmental attitudes (Franzen 2003). One possible explanation could
be the “top-down” spread of values from wealthier nations to poorer nations in which
they exert great influence. This may be especially true in former colonies.
Though the NEP is seen as a response to the post-materialist thesis, the major
difference between the two seems to be that the post-materialist shift seems to focus more
on differences between countries, while the NEP focuses more on differences within
countries (though it is noted that the shift has occurred elsewhere—suggesting more
evidence in favor of the shift). Neither perspective has carefully considered the
possibility that shifts in thinking about human impacts on the environment happen
unevenly among countries based on the characteristics of those countries, and their
relative positions to each other internationally. Regardless of these differences, the postmaterialist thesis is of great utility in the present study. Though the NEP is useful for
understanding environmental concern—something that the post-materialism literature
does a good job of as well—it is less useful for forming testable hypotheses.
Additionally, post-materialist values, while not in contrast to the research stemming from
the NEP, are generally much easier to categorize. In other words, the NEP is not tested in
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this research, but is used as a basis for understanding environmental attitudes more
thoroughly.

THE NECESSITY OF MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES
Environmental attitudes are complex and therefore require a variety of
perspectives to truly understand. What the NEP and the post-materialism thesis have in
common is that they are useful at the micro-level. No perspective explicitly attempts to
look at environmental values at both an individual and national level of analysis. But
another perspective exists that focuses on the structural level. The world-systems
perspective has been used in only a few empirical studies of human-environment
interaction, though it has been used extensively in other areas of social inquiry. In the
following, I will describe the world-systems perspective and some of its main ideas in
order to help situate the present research within this theoretical perspective.

THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
The world-systems perspective posits that nations can be divided into three main
categories based upon their position in the capitalist world-economy: (1) the core—those
nations with the highest levels of technological advancement and highly industrialized (or
even post-industrial) economies, such as the United States and many western European
nations; (2) the periphery—those less-developed nations which base their economy on
the extraction of raw natural resources, such as many sub-Saharan African nations; and
(3) the semi-periphery—those nations that fall somewhere between the core and
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periphery in the hierarchy, such as China, Mexico, and many of the former Soviet
republics (Wallerstein 1990).
Proponents of the world-systems perspective argue that the world is not a set of
distinct nation-states that operate without the influence of other nation-states and nonstate actors. Wallerstein (1972[2000]) posits that the failure of Marx’s predictions of a
socialist revolution is due to his focus on the “stages” of capitalist development and his
insistence on their “coexistence.” In response, Wallerstein (1972[2000]:74) on the other
hand, proposes that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries “there has been only
one world-system in existence, the capitalist world-economy.” In other words, there was
no global socialist or communist revolution because every nation-state was a part of a
single global economic system based on capitalism. In contrast to the work of past
sociologists, this capitalist world-system contains the necessary division of labor required
to ensure its continued functioning. Wallerstein (1972[2000]: 75) defines a world-system
as “a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems.” This distinction
is important, as is the discussion of the failures of Marxism in that this perspective is
capable of explaining not only that a single capitalist world-economy exists, but how it
operates across international boundaries.
When applied to the environmental debate, the logic of the world-systems
perspective suggests that by being a beneficiary of this single capitalist world-system,
core nations are able to export the negative consequences of their environmentally
destructive and resource intensive practices to peripheral and semi-peripheral states. For
example, the United States imports many raw materials from Africa, leaving the people
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of Africa to deal with the consequences of profit-enhancing resource extraction methods
while the people of the U.S. enjoy lower prices and greater ease of availability of
products made with these resources. At the same time, the U.S. exports hazardous
materials to other poorer (periphery) nations who often have no choice but to accept
them. These are two different ways in which the core is able to exploit the periphery via
the environment.
Wallerstein’s (2000) world-systems perspective has been used and tested in a
variety of sociological areas, including environmental sociology. Wallerstein (2000)
posits that much of the change that has occurred in the capitalist world-system follow the
Kondratieff wave (also called the “K-wave” or the “long wave,” see Figure 2.1) pattern,
each about 60 years in length, which help to explain the fluctuations that are easily
observable to any analysis of social change on a global scale. While environmental
degradation has occurred for much of human history, there was very little by way of
effect or visibility of such degradation until much more recently, at least on the scale that
we observe it today.
Another significant contribution to the discussion of the world capitalist economy
or the world-system from Wallerstein (2000) comes from his explanation of hegemony
within the system. Wallerstein suggests that this capitalist economy began in the
sixteenth century in Europe, and “Iberian America,” which is essentially the colonies of
Spain and Portugal in South and Central America. Shortly after it began, this capitalist
world-system expanded to cover the entire globe through both trade and war. Since the
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sixteenth century, the world has only known three instances of Hegemony (Wallerstein
2000: 253). For Wallerstein,
Hegemony in the interstate system refers to that situation in which the ongoing
rivalry between the so-called “great powers” is so unbalanced that one power
can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto
power) in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas.
The material base of such power lies in the ability of enterprises domiciled in that
power to operate more efficiently in all three major economic arenas—agroindustrial production, commerce, and finance (Wallerstein 2000: 255).
This status has only been reached in three instances, according to Wallerstein (2000:
256): (1) the United Provinces, essentially the Dutch Provinces [1625-1672]; (2) the
United Kingdom [1815-1873]; and the United States [1945-1967]1.
This recognition is important in any so-called world-system analysis in that the
recognition of the explicit existence of three hegemonic powers highlights the fact that
the capitalist world-economy is a singular entity that is dynamic. But in the example of
the environment, it is significant because, as Wallerstein notes, hegemony, by its very
definition requires that these powers are able to more efficiently operate in the three
major economic arenas, of which, the agricultural-industrial arena is of great importance,
if we are to understand the influences of this capitalist world-system on the condition of
the natural environment. In other words, hegemonic powers must be relatively efficient in
all three major economic arenas which ensures their position above semi-peripheral and
peripheral nations.

1

Though Wallerstein specifically cites 1967 as the end date for the U.S. as hegemonic power, when
calculating world-system positions for the analysis in Chapter 5, the U.S. was a significant outlier on all
three measures used to compute world-system position. The U.S. GDP in 2000 was $925,500,000,000. The
GDP per-capita was $33,900. Military expenditures were $276,700,000,000. One could argue that the U.S.
may still hold the title of hegemonic power.
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The contributions of Wallerstein to the world-system perspective cannot be
overstated. While much of his work is only peripherally related to the environment and
environmental degradation, it was carefully researched in a fashion that made later
discussion possible and useful for the field of environmental sociology. Wallerstein was
not alone in this endeavor, however, and others have followed intellectually from the
fundamentals of world-system analysis.
Similar to Wallerstein and other world-system scholars such as Giovanni Arrighi,
and Terence Hopkins, in Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (1989)
Christopher Chase-Dunn proposes that the use of the world-system perspective is
currently the most productive method for studying the modern world-system. What
differentiates Chase-Dunn (1989) from other world-system theorists is his advocacy for a
return to structural models of a dynamic world-system. While he acknowledges that a
return to structuralism, in a world of post-structuralism may seem odd, and indeed that it
goes against the position of many other scholars who prefer to use theoretical ideas as
“heuristic devices,” Chase-Dunn (1989:1) believes that “theory construction is a valuable
activity in its own right, and is a necessary part of the effort to build social science.”
Chase-Dunn (1989) explains the key concepts of the world-system perspective by
comparing them specifically to the work of Marx. While the research conducted in the
following chapters might have also been useful if framed under general Marxist ideas, the
specific claims laid out by Chase-Dunn quickly make it apparent that Marx, and the
Marxist scholars who followed him made a few oversights, some of which are specific to
relationships in the global economy. Chase-Dunn (1989:21-22) describes what he
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believes to be the basic characteristics of capitalism in Marx’s theory (in its fully
developed state) as follows:
1. Generalized commodity production: The production of commodities for
profitable sale on a price-setting (competitive) market.
2. Private ownership of the major means of production: Private capitalists
accumulate capital by making investment decisions within a logic of profit
maximization. This implies that the capitalist state does not directly interfere
in investment decisions or in the market, but rather provides legitimation and
order, using its power primarily to guarantee external defense and internal
peace consistent with the institutions of private property.
3. The wage system: Labor power is a commodity sold by proletarians (who do
not own means of production) to capitalist owners of the means of production
in a competitive labor market.
In contrast, however, Chase-Dunn (1989: 43) defines2 “real capitalism” as:
1. Generalized commodity production in which land, labor, and wealth are
substantially commodified.
2. Private ownership and/or control of the means of production, which may be
exercised by individuals or organizations, including single states, which are
themselves players in the larger competitive arena of commodity production
and geopolitics. This allows for “state capitalism.”
3. Accumulation of capital based on a mix of both competitive production of
commodities and political-military power, in which commodity production
has the greater weight in the determination of outcomes in the system as a
whole.
4. Exploitation of commodified labor which is, however, not always paid a
wage.
5. The combination of class exploitation with core/periphery exploitation such
that the former is more important quantitatively in the accumulation of
capital, but the latter is nevertheless essential because of its political effects
on the mobility of capital and in reducing class conflict and weakening anticapitalist movements in the core.
According to Chase-Dunn (1989), this reformulation of Marx’s core definition of
capitalism allows for more explicit assumption testing in research. Also, by incorporating
the role of the state (mainly in the form of political and military power), within the core2

Emphases in bold added by Author.

24

periphery hierarchy, Chase-Dunn differs from Wallerstein in that he does not assume the
totality of the capitalist world-system, providing him with more explanatory power and
the ability to analyze separately the boundaries of the world-system and those of the
modes of production. This makes it easier for us to discuss the phenomenon as it is
directly related to both the modes of production, as well as positions within the worldsystem.
Another contribution to the world-system perspective by Chase-Dunn (1989) is
his formulation of the structural features of the capitalist world-system: (1) the interstate
system – a system in which disproportionately powerful states compete for resources
through commodity production and geopolitical and military competition; (2) a
core/periphery hierarchy; (3) a more complex formulation of capitalism (see above); and
(4) commodity production is the central form of competition. These concepts allow us to
place the nation-states into the core-periphery hierarchy (see Kentor 2000).
A third contribution to the world-system perspective regards the cyclical nature of
the world-system. Though others working in this tradition have posited a cyclical
understanding of capitalist development, Chase-Dunn (1989) dismisses outright the
notion of stages within capitalism. For him, a single capitalist system that has seen
several periods of time differs from the view that capitalism itself undergoes a series of
transformations. The idea of a single capitalist world-system that has transitioned over
time is not supported empirically because of the degree to which we see coercion towards
workers and the gap between the pay earned by workers in core states when compared to
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peripheral states. In other words, “immiseration has tended to be relative rather than
absolute, while exploitation has everywhere increased” (Chase-Dunn 1989: 66-67).
Lastly, Chase-Dunn notes several more recent trends in the world-system.
Primarily, there have been increases in population and urbanization in peripheral and
semi-peripheral countries, especially the “increasing primacy of the largest cities within
developing countries” (Chase-Dunn 1989: 256). In other words, the empirical base
supporting the world-systems perspective includes the recognition of two factors which
both have been posited to be related to environmental degradation specifically (e.g.
urbanization and population growth) (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).
Chase-Dunn and Wallerstein are not the only scholars (Jorgenson forthcoming;
Rothman 1998) working in the development and testing of the world-system perspective
and several have made significant contributions to the perspective, and to the empirical
analysis of the perspective. Scholars from a variety of fields have attempted to explain in
other ways exactly how the position of one nation in the capitalist world-economy can
have an unequal impact on other nations in lower positions (Rothman 1998). This
proposition closely follows the findings made by world-systems scholars that nations in
the core have not only consumed materials imported from the periphery and semiperiphery, but have exported the waste from the use of these materials back to the
periphery and semi-periphery as well (Jorgenson forthcoming). For this reason, the
world-systems perspective is useful in that it requires researchers to focus on its “total
impacts, those generated within and beyond national borders” (York, Rosa, and Dietz
2003: 288). Jorgenson (forthcoming) finds that historically, more powerful societies
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have used their relative position of power to engage in unequal ecological exchanges with
other (typically) less-developed and less-powerful societies. He also notes that we must
“treat the world as a system of stratified countries in which the affluence and material
consumption of one country usually comes at the social and environmental expenses of
other countries” (Jorgenson forthcoming:17).

ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
Many scholars have addressed a variety of environmental issues within the
framework of the world-systems perspective. Deforestation, for instance has been shown
to occur in its most intense forms in semiperipheral nations (Bartley and Bergesen 1997;
Kick, Burns, Davis, Murray, and Murray 1996). This is explained by the long history of
exploitation of peripheral and semiperipheral forests by core countries. Additionally,
though population growth causes deforestation at all levels within the world-system, its
effects are much more pronounced in the semiperiphery (Bartley and Bergesen 1997).
While these particular studies do not address environmental attitudes specifically, they
make a compelling case about the differential exposure to negative environmental
problems that are caused by core states, while disproportionately affecting the non-core.
Following from this, research on international data should show some significant
differences in concern about the environment stemming directly from the exposure of
their citizens to environmental problems (Brechin and Kempton 1994).
Another environmental problem, global warming, has been examined as well
using the world-systems perspective. The overall findings from these analyses suggest a
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curvilinear relationship between relative position in the core-periphery hierarchy and
greenhouse gas (carbon dioxide and methane) emissions (Bartley and Bergesen 1997).
Burns, Davis, and Kick (1997) find that the two greenhouse gases are associated with
different levels of development. In other words, carbon dioxide is produced more in
highly developed countries, while methane is produced more in less developed countries.
This pattern does not reflect the relationship between position in the world-system and
economic development (Bartley and Bergesen 1997). This curvilinear relationship, which
has the shape of an inverted letter “U,” shows us that greenhouse gas emissions are the
most intense in moderately developed (semiperiphery) countries when compared to more
developed (core) and less developed (periphery) countries. Though the more highly
developed nations still contribute the most to overall carbon dioxide emissions, they
pollute less intensely, likely due to the efficiency with which they operate, compared to
the less developed nations who pollute more intensely, with less regulation, as they
attempt to “catch up” with core nations (Grimes and Roberts 1995)3.
Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) examine the changes in the world-system during the
last 12,000 years and propose the Iteration Model of World-System development (Figure
2.2). This model explains the formations of the world-system hierarchy in the following
manner: population growth causes an increase in the intensity of environmental
degradation. The type and degree of degradation depends on the production technology,
and the degree of exploitation of natural resources required to meet demand. This
increased population exerting higher levels of environmental degradation leads to a
3

It should be noted that as of this writing, China has surpassed the United States in Carbon emissions.
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variety of population pressures. The population pressures increase the amount of effort
required to meet one’s needs, often leading to emigration to regions where resources are
more readily available4, if such regions exist and are not already inhabited. Otherwise,
circumscription occurs, leading to competition between groups over resources. Conflict is
a likely outcome from circumscription, often leading to the formation of new hierarchies
(systems of stratification) to regulate the use of various new technologies and resources.
The formation of hierarchies and the processes of technological change are said to be
iterative because “population growth continues so that the same problems re-emerge on a
larger scale, and so similar problems need to be solved once again” (Chase-Dunn and
Hall 1997:410). These iterations lead directly to more population growth and the
subsequent environmental degradation.
This view of the relationship between the world-system and ecological
degradation is useful in that it puts environmental degradation at the center of the major
factors that lead to the formation of various hierarchies and technological changes
necessary to situate a society within the world-system. According to Bartley and
Bergesen (1997), in more complex societies, several new paths may potentially emerge in
the iteration model allowing for a society to bypass circumscription or conflict with
population pressures leading directly to new hierarchies and technological change.
Andrew Jorgenson (2003) has found that a country’s position in the coreperiphery hierarchy helps to explain per-capita ecological footprints. Ecological

4

According to Myers (2002) there are an estimated 25 million environmental refugees in the world,
alongside the approximately 26 million traditional refugees. These numbers were estimated to approach
100 million by 2010, based on many estimates. Current figures were unavailable.
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footprints act as a proxy measure of consumption, indicating that populations residing in
core nations exhibit higher levels of consumptive behavior than those living in the
periphery or semiperiphery. This effect occurs both directly and indirectly via the
influence of world-system position on urbanization, domestic income inequality, and
literacy rates.
Because per-capita ecological footprints are usually considered to be correlates of
negative environmental practices like deforestation and water pollution, Jorgenson (2003)
also makes a note that he finds these correlations to be negative (higher position in the
world-economy is associated with lower levels of both deforestation and water pollution),
a finding which is consistent with other researcher’s findings (for example, see Bergesen
and Bartley 2000).
Though it appears that researchers using the world-system perspective have made
significant headway in the environmental arena, the use of this perspective is a relatively
recent development within the discipline. Indeed, in the near future much growth in this
area should be expected; however, at this point we are just beginning to explore the
environment in the context of the world-system. One particular shortcoming of the worldsystems research is that it has not yet incorporated the attitudes of the individuals living
within the countries included in its samples. This limits our ability to understand the best
ways to influence attitudes that we expect to directly relate to the behaviors of these
individuals.
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ASSESSING POST-MATERIALISM, THE NEW ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM, AND
THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
Now that I have elaborated on the theoretical perspectives I believe are necessary
to understand the following analyses, and discussed some of the relevant literature
stemming from all three approaches, I hope to make clear exactly how these theoretical
perspectives will help to explain the research goals.
Chapter 3 provides findings from the analysis of individual-level characteristics
associated with attitudes towards the environment. As is consistent with other research
guided by the post-materialist thesis and the New Ecological Paradigm, I expect that
internationally there will be relatively high levels of concern among the citizens of
various nations. Where I differ from the NEP perspective is that I will argue that the
social bases of this environmental concern will have a variety of sources that have only
been assessed in a haphazard fashion in the past. In other words, the standard correlates
of environmental concern may have found support in research on U.S. and other Western
nations, but these correlates may not be as useful in understanding environmental
attitudes elsewhere. Additionally, I expect that wealthier nations—where the population
is more likely to have enjoyed access to more wealth—will have higher degrees of proenvironmental attitudes, as is consistent with the post-materialism thesis. The main
research questions for Chapter 3 are: Which characteristics best explain environmental
attitudes at the individual level? Secondly, How well do previous explanations of
environmental attitudes apply across nations?
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In preliminary analyses, these previously accepted correlates do not appear to
operate in the same way cross-nationally, and what is even more intriguing, is that there
does not appear to be an obvious pattern. For example, the religious affiliation of
respondents in Spain demonstrates a relatively strong correlation with environmental
attitudes, but religious affiliation is not associated with environmental attitudes in other
European nations. The NEP is often seen as the antithesis of the view that
environmentalism is a concern only for the wealthy (e.g. post-materialism). If this is an
accurate characterization of the NEP, we should expect to see no difference based on
socioeconomic status. That is, if environmental concern exists among the poor as well as
the rich, it should follow this pattern cross-nationally. Testing this, however, requires the
use of national level characteristics more than individual level characteristics. The results
of this analysis are presented in Chapter 3.
Next, I examine the extent to which world-system position is associated with
environmental attitudes. In order to test for these effects, I will use national level
characteristics to compute world-system positions (for these details see the methods
section in Chapter 4—based on the work of Kentor 2000 and Jorgenson 2003), and to
examine the relationship between world-system position (core, periphery, semiperiphery) and environmental attitudes.
Past research in the world-systems tradition suggests that higher levels of
consumption and degradation of the environment can both be explained, at least partially,
by the relative position of a nation in the core-periphery hierarchy. Others have suggested
that exposure to environmental problems, which should be more pronounced in the
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periphery and semi-periphery than in the core, may help to predict levels of
environmental concern (Brechin and Kempton 1994). Also, it has been suggested that
those with higher degrees of knowledge of environmental problems are more likely to be
concerned (Vining and Ebreo 1990). The main research questions for Chapter 5 are: How
does the location of a country in the core-periphery hierarchy impact environmental
attitudes? Additionally, does access to outside information (such as telephones, internet
access, etc.) contribute to a nation’s environmental attitudes?
While each of the analyses conducted in chapters 3 and 4 contribute uniquely to
the field of environmental sociology generally, and more specifically to the literature on
environmental attitudes and the world-systems perspective, I believe that the most useful
findings will come from a combination of individual and aggregate level characteristics.
Therefore, in Chapter 5 I use a Hierarchical Linear Modeling approach to
combine these two levels of analysis into a single and cohesive model. This model tests
all theoretical perspectives simultaneously in order to help develop a better understanding
of the importance of individual and national characteristics for understanding proenvironmental attitudes. While I make no claims about the explanatory power or heuristic
utility of either perspective over the others, this final analysis should help to clarify where
and how each perspective contributes to understanding environmental attitudes. The main
research questions for Chapter 5 are: Do individual- or national- level characteristics
better explain aggregate levels of environmental concern? Do these differences apply
across all levels of the core-periphery hierarchy? Last, if there are differences between
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individuals in different nations in terms of environmental attitudes, on which
characteristics do they vary?
In short, I examine environmental attitudes cross-nationally at both the individual
and national levels. The three analyses each contribute uniquely by allowing for a more
explicit test of the main hypotheses. Post-materialism is used in comparison to the New
Ecological Paradigm (NEP) in order to assess whether environmental attitudes appear to
vary by social class, or other characteristics of individuals. The world-systems
perspective is used to guide the national-level analyses in which I compare nations.
Overall, I expect to see that wealthy nations and individuals have the highest proenvironmental attitudes.
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CHAPTER 3: MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUAL ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES

35

CHAPTER 3: MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUAL ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES
Many solutions to environmental problems are proposed under the assumption
that changing people’s attitudes about their impact on the environment and environmental
degradation as a whole will lead people to change their corresponding behaviors (Jones
and Dunlap 1992). There is no consensus regarding how accurate this thinking is, and
many public campaigns attempting to educate the public seem to focus on individual
attitudes and behaviors (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Some governments, however, have
enacted sweeping legislation in order to deal with environmental problems, such as
curbing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing the availability of recycling programs, and
preventing deforestation (Bell 2004; Kalafatis, Pollard, East and Tsogas 1999; Krause
1993; Ottoman, Stafford, and Hartman 2006). It is unclear, however, whether national
level policy changes reflect individual attitudes, or if individual attitudes are affected by
public policy.
The social psychological examination of the attitude-behavior split has been
popular in recent decades, but has been relatively ineffective for measuring the attitudebehavior relationship in the environmental context largely because suitable measures of
environmental attitudes have yet to be tested in the context of the attitude-behavior split
(Ajzen 1985; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Fishbein 1967; Kaiser
et al. 1999). While scholars have sought to measure environmental attitudes, rarely have
they done so cross-nationally (Dunlap et al. 2000; Evans 2007; Tarrant and Cordell 1997;
Vining and Ebreo 1992). Additionally, the different methods of measuring environmental
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attitudes have led to inconsistencies in making cross-national comparisons using separate
studies. As difficult as these types of analyses are within one particular nation, such
problems are exacerbated when conducting research on international samples,
particularly when the data were collected by different organizations in each county. The
incompatibilities of these data have meant that very few cross-national studies have been
conducted, with even fewer that have included non-industrialized nations.
The data used in the following analyses include a number of core, peripheral and
semi-peripheral nations, making it one of the largest international datasets available that
includes items dealing with the environment. Having such a diverse sample creates
problems, however, particularly with respect to the applicability of concepts and
measures across various cultures with different structural facilities in place for informing
the citizens of a nation.
In this chapter I examine the factors that have been previously shown to be related
to environmental attitudes. These analyses focus on two main research questions: (1)
which characteristics of individual’s best explain environmental attitudes at the individual
level; and (2) how well do previous explanations of environmental attitudes apply across
nations. While it is clear that there is considerable variation among counties, this analysis
helps to focus future analyses by confirming and quantifying these variations based on
the most often cited correlates of environmental attitudes.

37

LITERATURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES
The central issue in environmental sociology is the relationship between society
and the natural environment. Environmental concern is an important concept in this line
of inquiry. It is conceptualized as an attitude toward the environment and environmental
issues (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978). One of the more common associations that
researchers make is the relationship between various characteristics of the respondents
and their levels of environmental concern. Several different correlates have been
identified in these studies with varying degrees of support in the findings. Of these
studies, perhaps the most compelling is the work of Tarrant and Cordell (1997) who
examine several different environmental concern scales and compare them to the most
commonly cited correlates of environmental concern. The findings of past work have
suggested that gender (Mohai 1992), residence – whether one lives in a rural versus urban
area (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), education (Jones and Dunlap 1992), income (Van
Liere and Dunlap 1980), age (Jones and Dunlap 1992), race (Mohai 1980; Mohai and
Bryant 1998), and political orientation – whether one is conservative or liberal (Van Liere
and Dunlap 1980), are all associated with environmental concern. Tarrant and Cordell
(1997) found that the environmental concern has significant associations with residence,
education, and age. This suggests that there are several socio-demographic characteristics
that should be controlled for when assessing environmental attitudes.
The post-materialist thesis posits that once basic human needs (food, clothing, and
shelter) have been met, people often shift the values that they consider to be important
from those which focus on meeting needs to those that focus on quality of life. For
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instance, according to Inglehart (1995), after the post-materialist shift people focus on
values like protecting freedom of speech, where before such a shift, people would have
valued maintaining order in the nation. Though these values are not tested here, the postmaterialist perspective provides insight into a potential reason for the prominence of
environmental attitudes. Support for the post-materialist thesis should demonstrate that
wealth or socioeconomic status is significantly related to environmental attitudes.
At the center of the following analyses lies the importance of individual attitudes.
Beyond these attitudes, however, lies the significance of structural and cultural
boundaries imposed on individuals by the nation in which they live. While believing that
the environment is in danger, and recognizing the types of behavioral change necessary to
minimize our individual impact on the natural world is an undeniable part of the puzzle,
some behavioral changes require things of us that are beyond most of our individual
means, such as recycling where facilities for recycling do not exist (Schultz and Oskamp
1996).
The world-systems perspective provides a much different picture of international
relations than many other perspectives. It has been useful for studying the environment in
the past; however it has not been used to examine environmental attitudes. In this
particular analysis, I focus on characteristics of individuals, however with an
international sample, differences between respondents from different countries become
interesting. In this analysis, I seek to examine the correlates of environmental attitudes as
they apply to respondents from different places. The world-system perspective suggests
that differences between countries should stem from position within the core-periphery
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hierarchy. That is, differences are due to the socio-historical, economic, and military
histories of the development of the modern world-system, rather than from differences in
the individuals within nations. This will be examined in later chapters in greater detail.

THE NEW ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM SCALE
The NEP is the basis for the NEP scale. The NEP scale is included in many
surveys of environmental attitudes and to examine five underlying dimensions of
environmental concern: (1) the balance of nature, (2) limits to growth, (3) human
domination over nature, (4) human exemptionalism, and (5) ecocrisis (Dunlap et al.
2000). The balance of nature dimension contained in the NEP scale is intended to
measure the degree to which one feels that the balance of nature is being threatened by
human activities. The limits to growth dimension seeks to provide an understanding of
the degree to which people accept the idea that there is a certain point at which the size of
the population and its impact on the environment can no longer be sustained. That is, the
point at which the current consumption of natural resources by people will diminish the
earth’s ability to recover. The human domination over nature dimension is intended to
measure the presence and strength of beliefs regarding the relationship between humans
and the natural environment, in which humans are viewed as dominant. The human
exemptionalism dimension is intended to examine the degree to which people believe that
humans are exempt from the forces and laws of nature (Dunlap et al. 2000). The final
dimension has been characterized as a measure of concern for the occurrence or
likelihood of catastrophic environmental changes (Dunlap et al. 2000; Evans et al. 2007).
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While the original scale is not available for the present research, many of these
characteristics were taken into consideration in the development and interpretation of the
research models presented here.
The majority of researchers of “environmental concern” (EC) appear to have
reached agreement on the importance of EC as a subject worthy of scholarly
investigation. Unfortunately, the major scholars doing research in this area have not
reached consensus on (1) the best definition of the concept of environmental concern
(Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Dunlap et al. 2000; Weigel and Weigel 1978; among
others), (2) the best way to measure such a concept (Franzen 2003), and (3) most
importantly, how such a concept is useful in understanding human-environment
interaction. Even without agreement on these core issues, the literature on environmental
concern appears to be one of the more active sub-areas within environmental sociology.
Past research has focused on measuring the reliability and validity of the NEP
scale, and has found that the scale continues to be reliable and valid for the various
populations on which it has been tested (Evans 2007). After revising the scale, Dunlap et
al. (2000) suggest that previous work using the scale has underscored several types of
criterion validity; known-group validity (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978) and predictive
validity (Tarrant and Cordell 1997; Vining and Ebreo 1992). Other studies using different
methods (particularly qualitative) have supported the content validity and construct
validity of the NEP scale (Dunlap et al. 2000).
The findings of this work have suggested that gender (Mohai 1992), residence –
whether one lives in a rural versus urban area (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), education

41

(Jones and Dunlap 1992), income (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), age (Jones and Dunlap
1992), race (Mohai 1980; Mohai and Bryant 1998), and political orientation – whether
one is conservative or liberal (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), have all had significant
associations with environmental concern. Tarrant and Cordell (1997) found that the NEP
scale had significant associations with residence, education, and age. This suggests that
there are several socio-demographic characteristics that should be controlled for when
examining environmental attitudes.
Other research has focused less on the measurement of environmental concern,
and more on its usefulness as a concept. One of the biggest shortcomings of large
national or international surveys on the topic of the environment is that rarely, if ever, do
they include all 15 of the NEP scales items. In fact, very few studies have done this, often
making the findings of past studies difficult to replicate. In other words, while the
specific items on the NEP scale may have undergone a rigorous battery of tests, because
it is so rarely included on large nationally (or internationally) representative datasets, it
may not be as useful to scholars seeking to study nations or, indeed, “world-systems.” In
other words, the NEP scale was not used in any survey appropriate for cross-national
analysis. For this reason, I use the NEP as a conceptual idea regarding the necessity for
testing factors which influence environmental attitudes, and do not explicitly assess the
NEP scale.
One issue with the NEP world view is that it proposes that people have been
steadily (however slowly) adopting a more eco-friendly world view. While there is
nothing inherently problematic with such a claim, it appears to be based more on a
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specific trend in environmentalism, than an actual change in human values or
preferences. That is, we see increased rates of responses identified as pro-environmental,
but it may be an artifact of social desirability, rather than actual changes in attitudes. In
other words, the NEP does not specify the reasons for such a change. In fact, others have
suggested that such measures are actually more concerned with the outcomes and
consequences of human behaviors than they are with environmental values (Dutcher
2007; Stern et al. 1995).
While the measures of environmental attitudes used in this study do not precisely
reflect the work of either Dunlap et al. (2000) or Weigel and Weigel (1978), it is clear
that the available measures of environmental concern do comprise at least one component
of what these two scales propose to measure. More specifically, both scales attempt to
measure how big of a problem people consider environmental degradation, while the
Environmental Concern scale also assesses willingness to contribute to solving these
problems. For this reason, it is reasonable to conclude that the measure of environmental
concern, while not ideal, used in the following analyses is sufficient to test any claims of
difference cross-nationally, and to use as the focus of measuring international attitudes
about the environment. Additionally, as Franzen (2003) notes, it is preferable to use
measures of attitudes which focus on the environment-economy trade-off when global
(rather than local) environmental concern is the focus of the study.
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HYPOTHESES
Previous research in the area suggests several important hypotheses about
individual-level factors influencing environmental attitudes. There exist many factors
which may influence environmental attitudes, but based on the availability of measures,
and previously significant findings about the relationship, I propose the following
hypotheses for these analyses:
Hypothesis 3.1: Higher social class standing will be associated with more
positive environmental attitudes.
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980; Inglehart 1995) have suggested that social class maybe
related to environmental attitudes. It is hypothesized that those with higher relative social
class will be more concerned with the preservation of the natural environment than those
who have lower social class, because they will be more educated and wealthier, and will
be less concerned with the economic trade-offs necessary in order to protect the
environment. The post-materialist thesis also suggests that those with less trouble
ensuring their needs are met are more likely to value environmental protection.
Hypothesis 3.2: Higher age will be associated with more positive environmental
attitudes.
Jones and Dunlap (1992; among others) have found support for the age hypothesis, which
indicates that the elderly are typically more concerned about the environment than the
young. One possible explanation is that the elderly will be interested in preserving the
environment for their children and grandchildren, while younger people will not.
According to the post-materialist perspective (Ingelhart 1995), the age effect is likely a
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generational effect in which older people are more likely to have belonged to a generation
in which material values were more important during their youth (i.e. baby boomers, the
depression generation, etc.—at least in the U.S.). Additionally, these generations are
more likely to have shifted their values from materialist to post-materialist.
Hypothesis 3.3: Political conservatism (the “right”) will be negatively related to
positive environmental attitudes.
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) propose that political conservatism is associated with lower
levels of pro-environmental attitudes. Politically conservative attitudes tend to favor the
economic, social, and political institutions that are typically at odds with preservation of
nature.
Hypothesis 3.4: Confidence in social/governmental institutions will be positively
related to positive environmental attitudes.
Bernauer (1995) suggests that international issues, like many environmental problems are
less-likely to be solved when there are lower levels of confidence in social and
governmental institutions. This relationship is likely because having confidence in these
institutions and organizations means that one is more likely to believe what they tell you
with respects to the condition of the natural environment.
Hypothesis 3.5: Non Judeo-Christian religious traditions will be more positively
related to positive environmental attitudes.
White (1967) argues that the Judeo-Christian religious traditions have a worldview which
is inconsistent with a pro-environmental worldview. Several places in Judeo-Christian
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texts specify the divinely inspired relationship between man and nature. In most of these
cases, man is specified as the ruler or master of the natural world.
Hypothesis 3.6: Gender will have no significant relationship with positive
environmental attitudes.
While Kanagy and Nelsen (1995), Mohai (1992), Blocker and Eckberg (1997), and
Tarrant and Cordell (1997) have found relationships between environmental attitudes and
gender, the results have generally suggested that while women may be more concerned
about specific issues, the method of measurement of environmental concern appears to be
the biggest predictor of any differences here.
Hypothesis 3.7: Rural respondents will have more environmental concern than
urban respondents.
Samdahl and Robertson (1989) suggest that community size is positively related to one’s
perception of environmental problems and their support for change.

DATA AND METHODS
The data used for the current study come from the 1999-2001 collection of the
World Values Survey. This is an international study conducted by different entities in
each of the nations in which data was collected. Each nation had their own specific
methods of data collection with some using simple random samples of the population,
and with others using more complex proportionally stratified sampling procedures. The
specific analyses conducted in this paper are based on data from 27 countries during
1999-2000.
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Sample sizes for these 27 countries ranged from 720 to 3,000 persons, making up
from 2.1% to 8.5% of the total sample, with a total sample size of N = 34,555. For a
complete list of the countries and the sample sizes for each country see Table 3.1. Due to
the complexities of international data collection, and in the interest of space, I will not
describe the data collection procedures in greater detail. Information is available from the
World Values Survey website (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/).
The WVS is an ongoing international survey that is conducted by a variety of
organizations and institutions in participating countries. The mode of data collection used
is survey questionnaires conducted using face-to-face interviews whenever possible. Due
to the complexities of international data collection efforts, the sampling procedures vary
widely, depending on the nation in question. Another important difference between
nations is the age at which respondents were allowed to participate.
In the United States, 100 zip codes were randomly selected, and an interview
facility near these data points was selected in which to conduct the interviews. Telephone
numbers were randomly selected from a list of telephone numbers within a 15-mile
radius of the facility, and respondents were offered a cash incentive to participate in the
face-to-face interview. In several instances, the facility for interviewing included
respondents from two different sampling points (zip codes), and in other instances, no
suitable facility was found, so the data point was moved to the nearest location with a
suitable facility.
In China, a 40 county/city sample was used. The sample was selected using a
stratified multi-stage probability proportionate to size (PPS) technique in order to obtain a
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sufficient sample based on the past work of the Research Center of Contemporary China
(RCCC). After selecting the 40 counties and county-level cities, and several degrees of
further differentiation based upon the population size, number of townships and streets
contained therein, 25 households in each sampling unit were selected. After each
household was selected, the member of the household aged 18 or over who participated
was selected at random.
These descriptions help to illustrate the differences used in the sampling
techniques in various countries. While these techniques varied greatly, we can be
confident that the data was collected with strict scientific standards which make crossnational comparisons possible.
Though missing data was only moderate (i.e. < 10% on any particular variable), I
used multiple imputation in the interest of having the most complete data possible. To
accomplish this, I used the ice module in Stata. I created five imputed datasets on which
to conduct the analyses in this section. More information about the ice module can be
found at the Stata website (http://www.statajournal.com/article.html?article=st0067_2 or
http://www.stata.com). Once the imputed dataset is created, the mim module is used in
Stata in order to allow me to analyze the five imputed datasets while reporting a single
set of results. In order to test for the inflation of significance values, I ran the analyses
several times on each imputed dataset, as well as 5% samples of each, and then finally on
the whole dataset using the mim module. The results of these preliminary analyses
indicate that the large sample size does not artificially inflate the significance of these
findings.
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variables for the individual- level analyses are two-fold: first, a
scale intended to measure environmental attitudes which relate to willingness to make
economic sacrifice in favor of the environment. The scale is created by using the sum of
two items yielding a Chronbach’s Alpha of .81. The two items contained in the scale ask
the respondents: “how strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I
would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent
environmental pollution” and; “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent
environmental pollution.” The two items used to construct the scale are coded such that a
response more favorable to the environment yields a higher score.
For the second dependent variable, a third question asked respondents: “Here are
two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic
growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?” (1) “Protecting the
environment should be given priority; even if it causes slower economic growth and
some loss of jobs” or (2) “Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority,
even if the environment suffers to some extent.” This variable measures environmental
attitudes differently, by comparing economic tradeoffs often required in favor of
environmental protection.
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Inglehart (1995) has suggested that social class may play a role in the
development of environmental attitudes. For this analysis, I use several measures of
social class: First, I use a measure of subjective social class, which asked respondents:
“people sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle
class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: (1)
upper class, (2) upper middle class, (3) lower middle class, (4) working class, or (5)
lower class.” Their responses were coded such that a higher subjective social class was
given a higher score. In other words, if they chose “upper class” they were coded as a 5,
and conversely, if they chose “lower class,” they were coded as a 1. The average
subjective social class score was 2.66 with a standard deviation of 1.0, indicating that
most respondents identified as being somewhere between “working class” and “lower
middle class.” Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution on this variable.
Next, I included a measure of income to account for a more objective
measurement of social class. The income variable was created from an item which asked
respondents to choose the income that most closely matches their own from a list of
values. In most countries, the list included 10 possible choices, while several had 11 and
one had 15. In the case of a nation having more than 10 choices, additional categories
were collapsed into the highest income category (i.e. 10). Unfortunately, this measure is
of the individual income, and not the household income of the respondent.
Finally, social class measures should account for education as well. I assess
education by using a categorical variable which assigns respondents to one of six
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categories for the highest level of education achieved. Respondents were asked what the
highest year of schooling they completed was. Their responses were coded into: (1) “no
formal education,” (2) “some primary school,” (3) “some secondary school,” (4)
“completed secondary school,” (5) “some college,” or (6) “college degree or higher.” The
“no formal education” category was used as the reference. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
distribution of the sample by education.
Previous research has also proposed an age hypothesis that suggests that the
elderly will be less concerned about the environment than the youth will be (Jones and
Dunlap 1992). Other research has found support for such a hypothesis (Tarrant and
Cordell 1997; Kanagy and Nelsen 1995). In order to account for this pattern, I use an age
variable computed by subtracting the date of birth of the respondent from the date of the
interview. This results in an age range from 15 to 97 years old (imputed values ignored).
The average age for the full sample was 40.12 years with a standard deviation of 15.9
years5.
It has also been hypothesized that politically conservative values are associated
with lower levels of pro-environmental attitudes (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980). In order
to assess this effect, I used an item which asked respondents the following: “In political
matters, people talk of ‘the left,’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this
scale, generally speaking?” The responses were coded as a score from 1 to 10 with 1
being left and 10 being right. The more right-wing the respondent, the higher their score
5

In preliminary analyses I checked logged and squared age distributions, which were not significantly
different than using the normal age variable. I left the age variable in its original form in order to more
easily interpret the results.
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on the measure. The sample mean was 5.8, indicating a slightly right-wing average
among respondents. I refer to those who are politically right-wing as “conservative6”.
Thomas Bernauer (1995) suggests that it is important in international analyses to
assess confidence in social institutions because with lower levels of confidence in
institutions, international collaboration is less likely to be successful. In order to control
for this effect I include a scale which measures the degree of confidence an individual has
in several governmental institutions. The institutions included are the armed forces,
police, government in Washington, political parties, Parliament, and the Civil Service.
These variables were combined into a mean scale with high alpha reliability ( = .86).
Additionally, I include a measure of confidence in the environmental movement.
Next, I assess the affect of religious affiliation on environmental attitudes. Lynn
White Jr. (1967) proposed that a Judeo-Christian theological view was inherently
inconsistent with pro-environmental attitudes. Respondents were asked “do you belong to
a religious denomination?” if yes, the respondents were able to choose from: “Roman
Catholic,” “Protestant,” “Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.),” “Jewish,” “Muslim,” “Hindu,”
or “Buddhist.” The respondents were also able to choose “no, not a member,” “no
answer” or they were able to write in a specific denomination. In this analysis, I use the
seven categories, plus a category “Evangelical” (the largest “other”), a category for “no”
religious preference, and a category for “other religious denomination.” The
“Evangelical” label can lead to some confusion, however, so I collapsed “Protestant” and
6

I fully recognize that political conservatism is not necessarily the equivalent of being politically rightwing, however in an effort to simplify the language, I choose to use the term conservative instead of
“politically right-wing.”
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“Evangelical” into a single group. Because the Evangelical group is self-identified, and is
written-in, many Evangelicals might have reported being “Protestant.” Similarly, many
who identified as Protestant might have better been categorized as Evangelical. It has
been suggested that even within the Christian faith; there are differences between
traditions with respect to the environment (Sherkat and Ellison 2007). This goes counter
to the argument provided by White (1967). Unfortunately, by collapsing the Evangelical
and Protestant groups into a single group, I lose the ability to assess specific differences
between traditions. Figure 3.3 shows the frequencies of each religious tradition. In the
following models, I use the “no religious preference” group as the referent.
Gender norms may also play a role in helping to determine attitudes towards the
environment (Kanagy and Nelsen 1995). Mohai (1992) and others have found support for
a gender hypothesis which recognizes the importance of cultural definitions of
masculinity and femininity. These norms are likely to vary considerably by both national
origin, and religious preferences. Respondents were asked their sex and those responses
were coded into a dichotomous measure in which men were coded as zero, and women
were coded as one. The sample had a gender breakdown of 48.5% men, and 51.5%
women in the full sample, though these proportions varied by country. Blocker and
Eckberg (1997) find that women tend to exhibit somewhat more environmental concern,
though they are no more likely to engage in environmental action than men. They note
that both men and women with higher social status and with more knowledge of
environmental issues, and greater degrees of trust in science are more likely to engage in
pro-environmental action. Similarly, Tarrant and Cordell (1997) find that women had a
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stronger relationship with environmental concern than did men, though it was noted that
the method of measuring environmental concern made a difference.
Tarrant and Cordell (1997; among others) have suggested that urban and rural
residents of a country may have differing opinions on the issue of the environment. Rural
or urban residence has not been shown to be statistically significantly related to
environmental attitudes. Samdahl and Robertson (1989) find that the size of the
community in which one lives is positively related to ones perception of environmental
problems and support for change. Generally, it appears that the research on the
relationship between residence and environmental concern has gone both ways, making it
difficult to determine how important it actually is (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980). These
relationships have rarely been examined with international samples, however. In order to
best capture this with the World Values Survey data, I created a dichotomous measure of
urban versus rural. Due to the difficulties inherent to international data, there were some
countries that used different population sizes for a variable asking the respondents the
population of their town of residence. So I created a dummy variable using approximately
50,000 residents as the cut off for urban, with towns of 50,000+ residents being
considered urban. For countries which did not have a clear 50,000 person population cut
off, I used the middle category which was usually within 20,000 of this 50,000 person
cutoff. This yields a variable in which 53.5% are considered rural and 46.5% are
considered urban.
Table 3.2 shows the bivariate correlations for all of the variables used in the
following models. With such a large sample it is not surprising that most of the
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relationships are significant at the p < .05 level or higher. Many of the correlations are
quite small, even for variables that seem to be intuitively related to each other. This
suggests to me that there are a lot of factors that influence environmental attitudes,
beyond what have been suggested in previous research.

FINDINGS
These analyses required the use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and
logistic regression techniques. OLS regression allows one to assess the additive effects of
a series of variables on the variance of another variable. In this case, the independent
variables are regressed on the willingness to sacrifice scale. The results of this analysis
are shown below in Table 3.3. The mim module in Stata is used to run analyses on
multiply imputed datasets. One of the downfalls of this method is that it does not
compute the R-squared coefficient for the proposed regression model. I
ran the a regression on each of the imputed data sets individually, to overcome this issue,
and the results below represent a model with an adjusted R-squared coefficient of about
.06. In other words, the combination of independent variables explains about 6% of the
variance in this measure of environmental attitudes. Though this is relatively low, it is
similar to the findings of other studies on environmental attitudes, and a high R-squared
value is not necessary to find support for the proposed hypotheses.
Many of the regression coefficient effects are statistically significant. Confidence
in Government Institutions is statistically significant (p < .001). This effect is positive,
and is consistent with hypothesis 3.4. In other words, as expected, respondents with more
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confidence in government institutions have more positive environmental attitudes.
Specifically, a one unit change in confidence in government institutions is associated
with a .158 unit change in environmental attitudes. Similarly, confidence in the
environmental movement has a statistically significant (p < .001) positive effect on
environmental attitudes. The B coefficient of .231 represents a 23% increase in
environmental attitudes for each one unit change in confidence in the environmental
movement.
The results for social class standing are mixed. Education and subjective social
class are significantly (p < .001) and positively associated with environmental attitudes.
For the education variables, each level of education is associated with a respectively
increasing effect on environmental attitudes. For example, those with some primary
education are significantly different from those with no education, and are associated
with a .170 unit change in environmental attitudes. Furthermore, those who have
completed college are associated with a .551 unit change in environmental attitudes when
compared to those with no education. A smaller effect ( = .090) is found between
subjective social class and environmental attitudes. The income measure is not
statistically associated with environmental attitudes. These findings support hypothesis
3.1 and are consistent with the post-materialist thesis.
Urban residence is not statistically associated with environmental attitudes, but
age is. A one year increase in age is associated with a -.001 unit change in environmental
attitudes. These results refute hypotheses 3.2 and 3.7. Additionally, sex is negatively
associated (p < .001) with environmental attitudes. Sex is coded as a dummy variable
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with women coded as one, and men coded as zero. This suggests that or a one unit
increase in sex, there is -.068 unit change in environmental attitudes. In other words, men
tend to have slightly more positive environmental attitudes than women. This is not
supportive of hypothesis 3.6. Similarly, political conservatism (politically right wing)
was hypothesized (hypothesis 3.3) to be negatively related to environmental attitudes.
The analysis suggests otherwise; in this case, a one unit increase in political conservatism
is associated with a .032 (p < .001) unit increase in environmental attitudes. In other
words, respondents who identified as more politically “right,” also have higher
environmental attitudes.
Lastly, the results suggest mixed results for hypothesis 3.5. More specifically, it
was hypothesized that non Judeo-Christian religious traditions would be associated with
more positive environmental attitudes. The results tend to show that even though most of
the Christian traditions have a negative relationship with environmental attitudes (when
compared to the reference category “no religious preference”), Jews, Buddhists, and
Muslims are not significantly different from those with no religious preference. While
this demonstrates partial support for the hypothesis, Hindu respondents exhibit a similar
effect as the Christian traditions, which is counter to the hypothesis. In other words, with
the exception of Orthodox Christians, all religious groups are associated with negative
environmental attitudes.
The second analysis uses logistic regression techniques to test the effects of the
independent variables on the dichotomous outcome variables. The logistic regression
results are presented in table 3.4. The odds-ratios are reported in the first column. The
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odds ratio represents the change in odds that are expected for a person with a certain
score on the independent variable will fall into the 1 category of the dichotomous
outcome (dependent) variable. While confidence in government institutions is not
statistically associated with one outcome over the other, confidence in the environmental
movement is. Specifically, for each one unit increase in confidence in the environmental
movement, a respondent is 1.29 times, or 29% more likely to have given the environment
priority over the economy. This indicates mixed results for hypothesis 3.4.
Hypothesis 3.1 suggests a similar pattern. Income is not significantly associated
with choosing the environment over the economy, but subjective social class is. The
effect is minimal; those with a higher subjective social class are about 6% more likely to
give the environment priority over the economy. The education variables were dummy
coded for the logistic regression models, and respondents identifying as having “no
formal education” used as the reference category. The results show that while having
some primary or secondary education is not statistically different from having no formal
education when it comes to the likelihood of preferring environmental protection over
economic growth. Completing secondary education is statistically significant, indicating
that those who complete secondary education are about 1.3 times more likely to favor
environmental protection. The effect is similar but larger for those with some college
education and those who completed college with an 81% and 96% increase in the
likelihood of favoring environmental protection over economic growth. Together, these
findings indicate support for hypothesis 3.1.

58

Hypothesis 3.7 is not supported, as urban respondents and rural respondents are
not significantly different in their support for the environment over the economy.
According to hypothesis 3.3; political conservatism is expected to be related to decreased
odds of favoring the environment over the economy. The results indicate that for a oneunit increase in political conservatism, respondents are about 1% more likely to favor
environmental protection over economic growth. This finding does not support the
hypothesis. The age hypothesis (hypothesis 3.2) is supported, as age is a significant
predictor of support for environmental protection. Specifically, for each one year increase
in age, respondents are .2% more likely to favor environmental protection over economic
growth. Hypothesis 3.6, however is supported, as gender is not statistically related to the
likelihood of favoring environmental protection over environmental growth.
The findings for religion are interesting. Hypothesis 3.5 states that Non JudeoChristian respondents will have more positive environmental attitudes. When compared
to those with no religious preference, it appears that of those with statistically significant
associations the Judeo-Christian traditions have lower odds ratios. Protestants, for
example are about 32% less likely to favor the protection of the environment over
economic growth. Muslims are about 29% less likely, and Orthodox Christians are about
20% less likely. A similar relationship appears for Buddhists and those who listed “some
other religion.” While the “other” category included a variety of Christian traditions, it
included non-Christian respondents as well7. This indicates that the findings for
7

Though the “other” category included a variety of smaller Christian traditions, it contained mainly nonChristians. Additionally, most of these groups would be difficult, if not impossible to re-categorize into
other groups.
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hypothesis 3.5 are at the very best, mixed. Hindu’s and Catholic’s are not significantly
different from those with no religious preference.
While the hypotheses have found mixed support in the analyses, the overall goal
of assessing cross-national environmental attitudes and the factors associated with them
appears to point out a number of other issues. Perhaps the largest issue at hand is how
applicable these findings are cross-nationally. Preliminary analyses suggest that there are
some significant differences between nations when considering the applicability of these
hypothesized relationships. For instance, the adjusted R-squared values for the OLS
model ranged from -.0007 (none of the predictors are significant) in Puerto Rico. to .1531
(about 15% of the variance in environmental attitudes) in Vietnam. With differences this
large, it is clear that accounting for other sources of variance is necessary, particularly
when conducting international analyses. The country-specific adjusted R-squared
coefficients are listed in Table 3.5.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The previous explanations of environmental attitudes appear to cover only a small
portion of the variance in the actual measurement of these attitudes. One way of
interpreting this is that the issue is so complex and multifaceted that it is difficult to
accurately formulate how to assess attitudes and which characteristics of people influence
environmental attitudes. While many studies have addressed this particular issue within a
single nation, or a subset of similar nations, rarely has anyone attempted to address this
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issue internationally (Dunlap et al. 2000; Evans 2007; Tarrant and Cordell 1997; Vining
and Ebreo 1992).
The overall result of these analyses suggests three important things about
explaining environmental attitudes with individual characteristics: (1) Social class
appears to have an impact on environmental attitudes, though how social class is
measured appears to be an important determinant of exactly how this relationship
operates; (2) confidence in social and/or governmental institutions seems to influence
environmental attitudes, but in some instances, not in the way one should expect; and (3)
there is evidence that religious beliefs play a role in the development of these attitudes as
well, though the role religion plays may be difficult to accurately capture.
The concept of social class has been operationalized in a variety of ways (Bollen
et al. 2001). Unfortunately, there is little agreement on how to measure it. While asking
people which social class category they belong to might be an easy way to overcome the
difficulty in accurately measuring something as complex as social class, it may be prone
to bias introduced by the assumption that one belongs to a group, for instance, the
working class, when in reality they would better be categorized as middle class,
particularly when a person lives in a social setting that values hard work or a working
class identity. Additionally, some social classes have stigma associated with them,
reducing the likelihood of respondents choosing that category. On the other hand,
measures of income can become very convoluted, particularly when conducting crossnational analyses, as even splitting income into 10 categories does not really tell the
researcher about what it means to have one category over another except that one
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category means a person earns more money than someone in a different category.
Additionally, with this data, respondents were asked their own income, and not their
household income, which can mask the true effect of income on environmental attitudes.
Education appeared to also be an important component of social class, and a relatively
clear one for at least the first analysis. According to the post-materialist thesis, we should
not be surprised by this finding, as education, social class and income are all associated
with the formation of post-materialist values.
As Bernauer (1995) suggests, confidence in government and social institutions
can be important with issues that have international effects. The findings clearly show
that confidence in government institutions can have a positive impact on environmental
attitudes, though confidence in the environmental movement seems to point to other
issues. It is undeniable that the effects of environmental degradation are far-reaching, and
we would likely expect international collaboration, yet there are still some hold-outs
among nations. Is it that the citizens of these nations are unsure of the severity of the
problem? Or could it be related to how much confidence they have in their governments?
Religion can often be a significant driving force for social change as well as for
maintaining the status quo, and the findings here suggest the same. While religious
beliefs can be overwhelmingly complex and detailed, White’s (1967) thesis seems to be a
drastic oversimplification of the reality of the religion-environmental attitude
relationship. To date, researchers have not reached an agreement about the direction of
the religion environment relationship; however, some have suggested that these mostly
inconsistent findings can be attributed to the measurement of some concepts used in past
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analyses (Sherkat and Ellison 2007). The more traditional view is that those with more
literal interpretations of religious texts (specifically, the Christian bible) typically have
lower levels of pro-environmental attitudes (Greeley 1993; Hand and Van Liere 1984;
Lowry 1995 with some exceptions). Others have suggested that any relationship between
pro-environmental attitudes and religious beliefs or religiosity can be explained with the
addition of other structural factors, such as social class, age, gender, and region (Kanagy
and Nelsen 1995), or that measures of religiosity are simply poor predictors of proenvironmental orientations (Boyd 1999). This suggests that perhaps the way in which
religion is measured is equally as important as its actual effect on environmental
attitudes. Nevertheless, it endures as a variable which should, at the very minimum, be
included in such analyses.
Additionally, differences between nations appear to be significant, though not in
any clear sense at this point. In the following chapter, I will examine the importance of
differences in the countries themselves. It appears, at least at this point, that social class,
religious identification, and confidence in government institutions are the most
significant predictors of environmental attitudes. Further analyses are necessary to
understand how these factors (and others) impact environmental attitudes when compared
to structural constraints within specific countries, like those imposed by the world-system
hierarchy.
The two main research questions guiding this analysis suggests the following
conclusions: (1) religious beliefs, social class, and confidence in social and governmental
institutions are the strongest predictors of environmental attitudes at the individual level;
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and (2) many of the previously hypothesized models of explaining environmental
attitudes are less successful with an international sample. While other factors are
certainly useful for explaining environmental attitudes, few operated consistently across
dependent variables, others are not significant predictors. This suggests that previous
research models are not as useful in international analyses because there are nationallevel differences between nations that are unable to be assessed with individual level
data.
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CHAPTER 4: MEASUREMENT OF NATIONAL-LEVEL ENVIRONMENTAL
ATTITUDES
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CHAPTER 4: MEASUREMENT OF NATIONAL-LEVEL ENVIRONMENTAL
ATTITUDES
Environmental attitudes and their associated behaviors depend not only upon the
characteristics of individuals, but also on the policies, both national and international, of
various national governments. Actual change, however, could require more than proenvironmental attitudes. Additionally, the infrastructure of a society could be associated
with the likelihood of pro-environmental change. For example, it would be hard for
individual attitudes about recycling to influence the actual rates of recycling if the
infrastructure necessary to facilitate recycling was unavailable.
The world-systems perspective has been useful in other fields in order to
understand how the core-periphery hierarchy has been instrumental in impacting the lives
of people. World-systems researchers have been able to demonstrate the powerful effects
of the modern world-system on the natural world (Bartley and Bergesen 1997; Kick,
Burns, Davis, Murray, and Murray 1996). Other factors related to world-system position,
such as access to information, may also be important structural constraints that should be
considered when examining influences on environmental attitudes.
I assess two research questions about the relationship between national-level
characteristics and aggregate environmental attitudes: (1) How is the location of countries
in the core-periphery hierarchy of the modern world-system associated with aggregate
environmental attitudes? and, (2) Does access to outside information through telephones,
and the internet contribute to the development of average national environmental
attitudes? Do these associations persist when other characteristics are included in the
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model, such as Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) scores, the proportions of the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) made up of the agricultural, service, and industry sector,
and the type of government (e.g. Republic, Monarchy, etc).

LITERATURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES
Most of the literature on environmental attitudes focuses on the characteristics of
individuals that influence their environmental attitudes. While this is useful for
understanding differences in groups of people within a single nation, it is less useful for
cross-national comparisons because it ignores the importance of structural constraints
imposed by governments, economic systems, and access to information. Put differently,
understanding the characteristics of individuals that influence environmental attitudes is
only useful within a nation, as there is significant variation of these characteristics across
nations.
Previous research has rarely examined both individuals within nations and
between nation differences in environmental attitudes and correlates of environmental
attitudes. In the few studies that have done both, there have been serious methodological
limitations: first, the cross-national examples tend to focus on peer countries, that is,
nations which are similarly developed and/or are economically and politically similar in
other ways. Second, they assess environmental attitudes in very different ways, making
comparisons difficult.
One of the more frequently cited examples of a cross-national study of
environmental attitudes is Arbuthnot and Lingg’s (1975) comparison of American and
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French environmental behaviors, knowledge, and attitudes. Their study’s findings
suggested two main things: (1) knowledge of environmental issues may act as a mediator
between attitudes and behaviors, and (2) that the difference between the American and
French samples with regards to the status of environmental awareness depends heavily on
the developmental status of the nation. Overall, however, the study is handicapped
mainly by small samples and by similarities between France and the U.S.
A more recent study examines “cross-cultural” rather than “cross-national”
differences in environmental attitudes compared Asian New Zealanders to European New
Zealanders (Milfont, Duckitt, and Cameron 2006). The authors examine the concept of
environmental attitudes psychologically by dividing it into three distinct conceptions of
environmental concern: (1) egoistic (me, my lifestyle, my health, and my future), (2)
altruistic (people in my county, all people, children, and future generations), and (3)
biospheric (plants, marine life, birds, and animals). The findings suggested some
differences between Asian New Zealanders and European New Zealanders with respects
to the motivations behind their environmental concern.
Olofsson and Öhman (2006) provide several compelling findings from their crossnational analysis. First, general beliefs about the environment are consistent predictors of
environmental concern. Second, education and political identification are also stable
predictors of environmental concern. Unfortunately, the sample is based on North
American and Scandinavian respondents to the 2000 International Social Science
Programme (ISSP) survey. These findings are important, but they are not applicable to a
more diverse sample of nations than the ISSP provides.
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Others have focused more on the determination of environmental behaviors than
the formation of attitudes. Oreg and Katz-Gerro (2006), for instance, find that postmaterialist values affect environmental concern, a finding which is not consistent with the
New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap et al. 2000), which in turn affects pro-environmental
behaviors. Similar to the Olofsson and Öhman (2006) study, the sample comes from the
ISSP’s 2000 data, which only includes a sample of peer-nations.
Similarly, Hayes’ (2001) study focuses on a cross-national comparison of gender,
scientific knowledge, and attitudes toward the environment. Her results suggest that
“even though men and women do differ in terms of their knowledge of scientific matters,
this has little or no effect on their attitudes toward the environment” (2001:657).
Additionally, even when controlling for scientific knowledge, there are few gender
differences with respects to environmental attitudes.
Though the contributions of past research are important in many regards, they
only provide a limited picture of the differences between nations. Each of these examples
shares one of two flaws: they either use a limited and culturally homogenous sampling of
nations, or they conceptualize environmental attitudes in an unconventional manner,
limiting the comparability of their findings to the findings of others.

THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Past research guided by the world-systems perspective has been relatively clear
and consistent on the relationship between world-system position and environmental
degradation of varying types (Bartley and Bergesen 1997; Kick, Burns, Davis, Murray,
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and Murray 1996). Generally, that is, the core is associated with lower degrees of
degradation than the periphery, while the semi-periphery engages in the highest degree of
environmental degradation. Though this past research does not assess environmental
attitudes in a world-systems perspective context, it continues to carry the connotation of a
relationship between behaviors and attitudes (Brechin and Kempton 1994).
The general argument is that developing nations (i.e. non-core) attempt to play
catch-up to the developed world and are much more likely to favor economic growth over
environmental protection. Additionally, the problem is confounded by the exportation of
environmental “bads” by core nations, and the exportation of environmental “goods” by
peripheral and semi-peripheral nations. In other words, wealthy nations are able to
effectively export undesirable outputs of industry and pollution to nations who need the
revenue, while poorer nations simultaneously degrade their own environment in an effort
to produce raw resources for sale to wealthier nations.
Past research suggests that the characteristics of nations are important as well.
The type of government, for example can be an important factor in assessing a nation’s
environmental performance (Scruggs 1999). Similarly, access that individuals have to
outside information through various forms of media, such as television, the internet, and
telephones should increase pro-environmental attitudes by helping them become
informed about global issues regarding the environment. Additionally, the actual
conditions of the environment in local context may also play a role in the formation of
attitudes about the environment.
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It is clear that national-level characteristics can affect environmental outcomes,
but how do national-level characteristics affect aggregate levels of environmental
concern? If attitudes and behaviors are related, then one should expect to find a similar
set of patterns between the characteristics of nations and the attitudes of its citizens. For
example, when confidence in the government is high among a population, governmental
policies are generally viewed with respect. On the other hand, even within the same
country, some citizens may be suspicious of government policies if the government has
inspired less confidence in them. The post-materialist thesis suggests that even among
the citizens of a nation, there may be several generations, each with a different
perspective on a variety of issues. If the post WWII generation in a country is suspicious
of the government, this can impact the average environmental attitudes of the country.
Those citizens who are poor, however, are more likely to value the means of survival
over more aesthetic values like environmental quality. This means that nations with
poorer, less educated citizens are likely to have a different association with aggregate
environmental attitudes than nations with wealthier, more educated citizens. Therefore
we should expect to see the association between characteristics of nations and the average
environmental attitudes of its citizens vary by position in the core-periphery hierarchy.

HYPOTHESES
Past research has indicated several likely hypotheses at the national-level:
Hypothesis 4.1: Core nations should have higher average pro-environmental
attitudes than periphery or semi-periphery nations.
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As suggested by Bartley and Bergesen (1997; among others), generally the core is
associated with lower degrees of environmental degradation. Similarly, because core
nations have higher GDP per-capita they tend to engage in more protective measures for
the environment than non-core nations. Additionally, the post-materialist view of
environmental attitudes suggests that the higher degrees of national wealth in core nations
should be associated with higher proportions of people in core nations who have met their
material needs, and would therefore be more likely to show preferences for post
materialist values like environmental protection.
Hypothesis 4.2: Nations with higher average access to information will have
higher aggregate pro-environmental attitudes.
Brechin and Kempton (1994) argue that experiencing environmental degradation should
lead to greater concern about the environment. Similarly, more access to information
about the environment should lead to higher pro-environmental attitudes. Access to
information is more likely to occur in wealthier core nations than in the periphery. If
greater information explains differences in attitudes by position in the world-system, then
including these measures should eliminate differences by position in the world-system.
Information and communication measure post-materialist rather than materialist
development in nations, because information exchange comes after basic needs are met.
Hypothesis 4.3: Lower scores on the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)
will be associated with higher aggregate pro-environmental attitudes.
Knowledge of environmental problems has been demonstrated to have influence on
environmental attitudes (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Such knowledge comes from many
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sources, including the various forms of media available in a country. Based on the worldsystems perspective, one would expect to see that those in the periphery and to a smaller
extent, the semi-periphery, are more likely to experience environmental degradation, and
that seeing the degradation first-hand would increase the likelihood of developing proenvironmental attitudes. Though core nations tend to have lower levels of degradation,
they also generally have governments that are more responsive to environmental
problems. The ESI is a composite measure that assesses a nation’s environmental wellbeing, as well as it’s governments responsiveness to these problems.

DATA AND METHODS
The data used for this analysis come from a variety of sources. Primarily, I use
data from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook (www.cia.gov). I do,
however, also include measures from the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI). The
ESI is an attempt to develop a composite measure of overall environmental performance
of most nations by aggregating known information on environmental degradation, policy,
and participation in international treaties on the environment. It is collaboration between
the World Economic Forum, the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and the
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), at Columbia
University (http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/). These data cover the year
2000. Finally, the dependent variable comes from the aggregated individual-level
environmental attitudes measures. These data come from the World Values Survey from
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the 1999-2001 wave. These data contain responses from people in 27 nations on several
important questions regarding the environment and their attitudes towards it.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The focal dependent variable for this analysis is the aggregated environmental
attitudes measures from the individual analyses in Chapter 3. These variables include: (1)
a scale intended to measure environmental attitudes which relate to willingness to make
economic sacrifice in favor of the environment. The scale is created by using the sum of
two items yielding a Chronbach’s Alpha of .81. The two items contained in the scale ask
the respondents: “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I
would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent
environmental pollution” and; “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent
environmental pollution.” The two items used to construct the scale are coded such that a
response more favorable to the environment yields a higher score. In order to use this
variable for the national-level analysis presented here, the mean for each country was
used as the score for the outcome variable. I refer to this variable as willingness to
sacrifice.
(2) A second question which asks respondents: “Here are two statements people
sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them
comes closer to your own point of view?” (1) “Protecting the environment should be
given priority; even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs” or (2)
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“Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment
suffers to some extent.” This variable measures environmental attitudes differently, by
requiring that one recognizes the tradeoffs inherent to environmental protection. In order
to use this variable for the national-level analysis presented here, the mean for each
country was used as the score for the outcome variable. It should be noted that for the
second dependent variable, the mean represents the proportion of respondents in that
nation who chose the first category, “protecting the environment should be given priority,
even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs,” the more proenvironmental response. I refer to this dependent variable as economic tradeoffs.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The main independent variable is a continuous measure of world-system position.
This is based heavily on the work of Jeffery Kentor (2000). The position in the worldsystem is measured by the following three items: (1) a measure of “Capital
Intensiveness,” which is measured by the Gross Domestic Product Per-Capita and is
intended to measure the “ability of an actor (country) to be more competitive in the
global marketplace”. (2) “Production Size [. . .] refers to the relative size of a country’s
productive infrastructure,” is measured by the Gross-Domestic Product (GDP). (3)
Military Expenditures in dollars, which “reflects a country’s ability to assert its will both
directly and indirectly in the world-economy by use of military force.”
Originally, Kentor specifies a 10-item model to measure three dimensions, but
finds that the three item version of the construct has a .98 correlation with the original
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measure and should be a suitable measure for most needs. The z-scores for each of these
three pieces of data are summed to arrive at the composite measure of position in the
world-economy (Kentor 2000). The core is comprised of those in the top third, the
periphery is comprised of those countries in the bottom third, and the semi-periphery
makes up the remainder of the nations. After completing this step, I compared my list of
countries at each level of the hierarchy to other work using similar techniques and found
no oddities. The list of core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral nations is provided in table
4.1, as well as the original world-system position scores. I also created dummy variables
of each level of the core-periphery hierarchy which are used in some of the plots in this
chapter.
Additionally, in order to assess objective environmental performance, I use the
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) score. The ESI is a composite measure of
environmental sustainability that includes a variety of factors such as the amount of
certain types of pollutants present in the water and air, efforts to reduce such pollution,
global stewardship, and the technological capacity to debate and solve environmental
problems. The scores range from 24.7 in Haiti, to 80.5 in Finland. The average ESI score
for all nations is 49.4, and for the countries in the analysis the mean is 48.52 indicating
that the sample used here is relatively consistent. Table 4.1 also contains the ESI scores
for the nations in the sample.
Other important variables used in this analysis include the number of internet
users per-capita, the number of televisions per-capita, the number of cellular telephones
per-capita, and the number of landline telephones per capita. Others have argued that
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knowledge of environmental problems is associated with attitudes, and by proxy,
environmental behaviors (Arbuthnot and Lingg 1975; Vining and Ebreo 1990). Access to
outside information should be a useful means of acquiring such knowledge, and
telephones, internet and television are the three most likely venues for this to occur. In
order to control for the U.S. as an extreme outlier, I have used the logged version of these
variables to compute the scatterplots below. This approach minimizes the extreme
influence of the U.S. on the regression line for the core nations. Additionally, I will
examine the type of government, as determined by the Central Intelligence Agency’s
(CIA) classification system. Scruggs (1999) found that the government types vary in
environmental performance specifically if governments sign, ratify, or enforce global
environmental treaties. This should be especially important in democratic societies in
which post-materialist values exhibit great influence on attitudes. Also, I assess
associations between both dependent variables and the sector composition of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in terms of the Industrial, Agricultural, and Service sectors.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
In order to conduct the following analyses, I use two techniques. First, I examine
the directions of relationships in order to clarify which patterns exist. Due to the small
sample size (N = 27) statistical significance in standard parametric statistical procedures
would be difficult to achieve. Therefore, I employ nonparametric tests of the relationships
between country level characteristics.
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Hypothesis 4.1 states that world-system position will be positively associated with
aggregate pro-environmental attitudes. Higher scores indicate closer to the core, therefore
a positive association indicates that those countries closer to the core will have higher
pro-environmental attitudes. Bivariate correlations between the world-systems position
score and the two environmental attitudes measures produce mixed results. The first
environmental attitudes measure, willingness to sacrifice, yields a Pearson’s R of -.142,
but the second environmental attitudes measure, economic tradeoffs, yields a correlation
of .257, suggesting that the association is much stronger for economic tradeoffs than for
willingness to sacrifice. The differences in the underlying concepts being measured, that
is, willingness to sacrifice to support saving the environment, versus tradeoffs between
environmental protection and economic growth should explain these differences. Figures
4.1 and 4.2 illustrate these relationships. It should be noted that the U.S. is the outlier in
these examples, as the U.S. has such a large GDP and Military Expenditures than other
nations included in the sample. In figure 4.1, world-system position is negatively
associated with willingness to sacrifice for all but the core. With economic tradeoffs,
however, the relationship is positive for all but the periphery. This distinct contradiction
suggests that the two outcomes—willingness to sacrifice and economic tradeoffs—are
assessing two different dimensions of environmental attitudes and they mean different
things to nations in different positions in the core-periphery hierarchy.
Hypothesis 4.2 states that access to outside information (television, internet, and
telephones) will be positively related to aggregate environmental attitudes. Bivariate
correlations show a moderate negative association between landline telephones per-capita
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and willingness to sacrifice (r = -.222); the association is stronger for cell phones percapita (r = -.301), but weaker for internet users per-capita (r = -.167), and weakest for
number of televisions per-capita (r = -.068). Because these correlations are all in the same
direction (negative) but of different strength, I conclude that more access to knowledge
from outside of a particular country does not increase pro-environmental attitudes, but
also that these indicators measure more than global knowledge. Therefore there is not
support for this particular hypothesis.
The economic tradeoffs measure of environmental concern illustrates mixed
results as well—with some positive, some negative and different sizes of correlations.
The correlations for landlines per-capita (r = -.368) and televisions per-capita (r = -.192_
with economic tradeoffs is negative, but internet users per-capita (r = .167) and cell
phones per-capita (r = .029) have positive associations with economic tradeoffs. These
mixed findings again suggest that there are some underlying differences between the two
environmental attitude measures as should be expected. In order to see if these effects are
influenced by world-system position, I constructed scatterplots to illustrate the
differences in slopes and intercepts on these variables, and further indicate if the
associations differ by world-system position. The results are presented in figures 4.3
through 4.10.
Assessing the patterns of association between sources of outside information and
environmental attitudes, the scatterplots make several things clear. First, by controlling
for world-system position, the differences in the slopes and intercepts are highlighted.
This is reassuring as it illustrates the powerful effects of the position of a nation within
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the core-periphery hierarchy. Second, we are able to observe the magnitude of these
effects. And finally, there are several important differences between the various sources
of outside information which may be useful in explaining differences in environmental
attitudes cross-nationally. In order to avoid the influence of outliers, the logged versions
of all of the measures of access to outside sources of information are used in these plots.
In figure 4.3, we again see that the relationship between willingness to sacrifice
and the logged number of cellular telephones is negative. Though this may seem
counterintuitive, it could be due to the increasing number of cellular-only households in
many nations, which certainly helps to explain the much steeper slope (and the higher
intercept) for semi-peripheral nations when compared to the periphery and core. Figure
4.7 illustrates a different pattern for the measure of economic tradeoffs, in which the
semi-periphery exhibits a positive effect while core and peripheral nations exhibit
negative effects.
Figures 4.4 and 4.8 assess the pattern of relationships between the logged number
of internet user’s per-capita on environmental attitudes. The results suggest a mixed
pattern where one measure of environmental attitudes tends to increase with more logged
internet users per capita, while the other decreases. The effect for the semi-periphery
tends to follow the overall pattern better than the effects of internet access in core and
peripheral nations. Overall, however, the effects of internet access on environmental
attitudes are inconsistent. One potential reason for this finding is that the measure only
accounts for internet user’s per-capita, and does not address the frequency with which
one has access to the internet. Additionally, having access to the internet can mean very
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different things for different people as the ways in which this access is used vary greatly
between people.
Figures 4.5 and 4.9 assess the pattern of relationship between the logged number
of land line telephones per-capita and environmental attitudes. The bivariate correlations
are negative, yet the scatterplots highlight several different effects which vary by position
in the world-system. It appears that the negative effect does not represent the semiperiphery when compared to economic tradeoffs, suggesting that there are other factors at
work. The core and the periphery, however, exhibit a clear negative trend. Again, this
highlights the large impact of the core on the overall pattern. One potential effect of the
core’s impact on the non-core is the “trickle-down” of technology and information. If this
is the case, we should expect environmental attitudes to do the same.
Figures 4.6 and 4.10 assess the degree of relationship between the logged number
of televisions per-capita and environmental attitudes. Overall, these variables have a
negative bivariate correlation. In the scatterplots, this is really only representative of the
peripheral nations, where the effect is negative. For willingness to sacrifice, the effect is
slightly negative for core and peripheral nations. For economic tradeoffs, however, the
effect is positive for the core and semi-periphery and negative for the periphery. Overall,
the effect of access to outside sources of information is limited to landline telephones,
which appears to be the most consistent correlate of those tested here.
Hypothesis 4.2 states that ESI score and environmental attitudes will be
negatively related. Though this seems counterintuitive, some scholars have suggested that
the degree to which environmental degradation is experienced will influence the strength
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of environmental attitudes (Brechin and Kempton 1994). The ESI contains several
measures of the actual condition of the environment for each nation. Therefore, one
would expect those nations with more highly degraded ecosystems to have higher proenvironmental attitudes. For the first measure of environmental attitudes (willingness to
sacrifice), respondents were asked how willingly they would pay to protect the
environment. This exhibits a Pearsons R of -.433, and it is statistically significant (p >
.05). The second measure of environmental attitudes (economic tradeoffs) asks whether
they would choose environmental protection over economic development. This
relationship exhibits a Pearsons R of .104 (not statistically significant), which suggests
once more that these two measures of environmental attitudes operate differently from
each other, tapping into multiple dimensions.
Scatterplots of these relationships also exhibit differences. For the economic
tradeoffs measure, core nations exhibit a positive relationship, while peripheral and semiperipheral nations exhibit negative effects. This can be explained in that residents of core
nations prefer to give up some economic growth for environmental protection as the
economies of these nations are relatively strong when compared to other non-core
nations, but more importantly, core nations have political means for such change in place.
For willingness to sacrifice, the effects are all negative, though to varying degrees. These
plots also help to illustrate the apparently large differences between the slopes and
intercepts for the nations when comparing scores on the ESI to environmental attitudes.
These plots are shown in figures 4.11 and 4.12. For the most part, ESI score and
environmental attitudes are related to one another in the hypothesized manner.
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Next, I conducted the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The Kolmogorov test is a
nonparametric test useful when one compares distributions within a single sample of
data. In short, it tests the null hypothesis that all variables have similar distributions
against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the groups differs in terms of their
distribution on a variable. Nonparametric tests do not assume a normally distributed
variable, though the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test uses a normal distribution function to test
the hypotheses. The results indicate that the distributions of logged number of landline
telephones per-capita, ESI scores, logged world-system position scores, willingness to
sacrifice, and economic tradeoffs are not significantly different from a hypothesized
normal distribution.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Perhaps the most important finding contained in this analysis is the relationship
between the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) score and the two measures of
environmental attitudes. While it is clear that the two dependent variables tap into
somewhat different dimensions of environmental attitudes; personal willingness to
sacrifice, and economic tradeoffs, it is less clear exactly why the patterns observed exist.
More specifically, why do the core nations have a positive relationship with the economic
tradeoffs measure of environmental attitudes? Though this finding in some ways mirrors
past research, specifically the findings of Grimes and Roberts (1995), it only appears to
apply to this one dimension of environmental attitudes, which is essentially a measure of
valuing environmental protection over economic growth.
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Other interesting findings regarding access to outside information suggest that
virtually any effects of access to information on environmental attitudes are generally
modified by position in the core-periphery hierarchy. Though these effects can be
interesting on their own, the small sample size makes it difficult to come to any solid
conclusions about World-system position’s effects on environmental attitudes. Also, the
effects of access to outside information appear to be extremely inconsistent for all
measures except for logged number of landline telephones per capita. This suggests that
in future analyses, using phones per capita might make the results more consistent and
useful. Counter to the expectation that access to outside information would help rather
than hinder environmental attitudes, I find that this relationship is negative. This is also
unexpected based on the post-materialist thesis as the development of these technologies
should coincide with the development of post-materialist values.
Other analyses also point to some interesting patterns, with respects to the
proportion of the GDP comprised of various economic sectors. For example, a
statistically significant association between degree of GDP comprised of the service
sector shows a positive correlation with World-system position score (.741 Pearsons R
significant at the .05 level), while the degree of GDP comprised of the agricultural sector
shows a similarly sized negative correlation (-.797 Pearsons R significant at the .05
level). Though this is not surprising, this may be an important factor to assess, as it would
appear that the agricultural lifestyle is less conducive to behaving in an environmentally
friendly manner, while being more conducive to developing higher levels of concern
about the state of the environment in the first place. Government type is not associated
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with environmental attitudes, as expected. These findings do not support the postmaterialist thesis, because the association between higher development and more
democratic governments does not have a positive association with pro-environmental
attitudes.
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CHAPTER 5: MULTILEVEL MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES
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CHAPTER 5: MULTILEVEL MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES
A variety of factors have been shown to be associated with environmental
attitudes. These factors, however, have been only approached from either the individuallevel, or from the national-level, and have not been assessed from both levels
simultaneously. Though much past research has been guided by the assumption that in
order to change people’s behavior their attitudes must be changed (Jones and Dunlap
1992), scholars have assumed that efforts to change public perceptions should be focused
on individual-level attitudes and behaviors (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Unfortunately, this
ignores the role of social policy and the availability of required infrastructure in changing
social behavior.
Dunlap et al. (2000) propose that humanity has entered a new paradigm in which
the human-environment relationship is no longer operating on the belief that the natural
world is unaffected by human behaviors. Moreover, environmental concern is not seen as
an affectation of the wealthy, but rather that even the poor—some of the people who are
most affected by environmental degradation—are concerned about the natural world as
well. While this perspective has been demonstrated to be useful in understanding
environmental attitudes in the wealthy industrialized nations in the West, it has generally
not been applied internationally.
The post-materialist thesis holds that a fundamental shift in the values of various
publics has occurred. Ingelhart (1995) finds that this change appears to have occurred
mainly among certain generations, the post WWII generation for example. Such changes
in values have decreased the importance of “materialist” values like national security and
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economic development, and increased the importance of “post-materialist” values like
environmental protection. Though this perspective has been assessed internationally, it
has generally only been found to impact certain generations (Inglehart 1995). If the postmaterialist thesis applies to environmental attitudes, one should expect to see significant
effects of social class characteristics on environmental attitudes, with the wealthier
respondents having more positive environmental attitudes.
The world-systems perspective proposes that by being a beneficiary of the single
capitalist world-system, wealthy core nations are able to export the negative
consequences of their environmentally destructive practices to poorer peripheral and
semi-peripheral nations. Furthermore, those in the core become less concerned about the
environment as they do not witness its degradation to the same extent as those in the
periphery. Though this perspective has been useful in many studies, it has generally
ignored environmental attitudes, and focused mainly on the characteristics of nations,
rather than on the characteristics of individuals. If the world-systems perspective is useful
for examining environmental attitudes, one should expect to find that the effect of worldsystem position remains relatively consistent, and that higher positions in the worldsystem are associated with higher pro-environmental attitudes.
The current analysis attempts to bridge the gap in past research by proposing a
multilevel model of environmental attitudes. In order to do this, I use the insights
provided by research that focuses on the individual-level and also on the national-level
characteristics that influence environmental attitudes simultaneously. I ask the following
research questions: Do individual- or national- level characteristics better explain levels
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of environmental concern? Do these differences apply across all levels of the coreperiphery hierarchy? Last, if there are differences between individuals in different
nations in terms of environmental attitudes, on which characteristics do they vary?

LITERATURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES
At the national level, previous research tends to have two major shortcomings:
first, it has tended to focus on nations that are developmentally and economically similar;
and second, it relies on different measures of environmental attitudes, limiting the ability
to make comparisons between otherwise similar studies. The findings are useful
nonetheless, especially considering that this level of measurement is far less common
than it is for individual-level analyses of environmental attitudes.
Studies have found that knowledge of environmental issues may act as a mediator
between attitudes and behaviors (Arbuthnot and Lingg 1975). Put differently, public
awareness of the extent of environmental degradation can mean the difference between
making behavioral changes and not making them. Additionally, research on cross-cultural
samples suggests that there are some significant differences in the motivating factors
behind the development of environmental concern, though other factors may exist which
can partially explain these differences (Milfont et al. 2006).
Olofsson and Öhman (2006) suggest that general beliefs about the environment
and political identification are consistent predictors of environmental concern. These
findings have been subject to criticism due to the similarities of the nations included. A
similar criticism was made by Arbuthnot and Lingg (1975) regarding their own findings.
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This criticism is important because findings based on similar developed nations limit the
comparability of those findings to the findings in less developed nations.
Counter to Dunlap et al.’s (2000) New Ecological Paradigm (NEP), Oreg and
Katz-Gerro (2006) find that post-materialist values affect environmental concern, which
then influence pro-environmental behaviors. These findings have also been criticized as
they focus on developmentally and economically similar nations, but are presented as
universal. Hayes (2001) examines gender in the context of knowledge of science and
attitudes toward the environment. She found that men and women do differ in terms of
their knowledge of scientific matters, but the difference in knowledge had little or no
effect on their environmental attitudes. She also notes that even when controlling for the
differences in men and women’s knowledge of science, there are few gender differences
in environmental attitudes.
The world-systems perspective has been used to examine national-level
characteristics, but has not been used to study the environmental attitudes of the people in
those nations. Yet world-systems scholars have demonstrated a relatively clear
relationship between environmental degradation and world-system position. If
environmental degradation and knowledge of environmental problems are associated
with environmental attitudes, it can be assumed that nations with more environmental
degradation will experience higher levels of environmental concern.
At the individual level, most of the literature on environmental attitudes has
focused on the measurement of environmental attitudes (Dunlap et al. 2000; Weigel and
Weigel 1978; among others). Other scholars have focused on the characteristics of people
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that influence their environmental attitudes. Mohai (1992) suggests that gender may play
an important role in environmental attitudes, though later studies have suggested that
there may be no substantial differences, just different ways to measure environmental
attitudes for men and women. Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) found that whether one lives
in a rural versus urban area may be a significant predictor of environmental attitudes.
Urban residents are more concerned about the condition of the environment than are rural
residents because rural residents are more likely to depend on the land directly (i.e.
through agricultural work) than urban residents.
Jones and Dunlap (1992; among others) argue that age is associated with the
development of environmental attitudes, because younger citizens are less concerned, and
older citizens are more concerned about the environment because the latter worry about
their offspring. Additionally, they cite education as a predictor of environmental attitudes.
Higher education is associated with higher concern. Income, as an indicator of social
class, is also associated with environmental attitudes. Specifically, there is evidence that
higher wealth is associated with higher environmental concern (Van Liere and Dunlap
1980). Additionally, Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) find that more liberal survey
participants have higher environmental concern.
Though much of the past research focuses on the characteristics of individuals,
the characteristics of nations may be equally useful for a more thorough examination of
environmental attitudes. Past research has not examined individual-level environmental
attitudes as they relate to the characteristics of the nations in which they live. The NEP is
a useful perspective to examine individual-level environmental attitudes, though it does
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not incorporate the characteristics of nations into the perspective. The world-systems
perspective, on the other hand, generally ignores the characteristics of individuals but
provides great insight into the characteristics of nations. By using both perspectives
together, we get a clearer picture of these individual and contextual effects as they relate
to environmental attitudes. Additionally, we can assess if associations within nations are
similar or different in core and periphery nations.

HYPOTHESES
Previous research on environmental attitudes suggests several hypotheses
regarding both individual- and national- level factors that influence environmental
attitudes. Based on these hypotheses, and the findings in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I
propose the following hypotheses for these analyses:
Hypothesis 5.1: Higher social class standing will be associated with more
positive environmental attitudes.
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) suggest that social class position may be an important
predictor of environmental attitudes. It is hypothesized that those with higher social class
will be more concerned with the preservation of the environment than those of lower
social class, and will be less concerned with the economic trade-offs necessary in order to
protect the environment. Additionally, post-material values are expected to be higher
among those with greater wealth as they will have fewer problems satisfying their
material needs (Inglehart 1995).
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Hypothesis 5.2: Higher age will be associated with more positive environmental
attitudes.
Jones and Dunlap (1992; among others) have found support for the age hypothesis, which
indicates that the elderly are typically more concerned about the environment than the
young. One possible explanation is that the elderly will be interested in preserving the
environment for their children and grandchildren, while younger people will not.
Additionally, older people are more likely to belong to the post-materialist group, who
has fewer problems satisfying material needs.
Hypothesis 5.3: Political conservatism (the “right”) will be negatively related to
positive environmental attitudes.
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) propose that political conservatism is associated with lower
levels of pro-environmental attitudes. Politically conservative attitudes tend to favor the
economic, social, and political institutions that are typically at odds with preservation of
nature.
Hypothesis 5.4: Confidence in social/governmental institutions will be positively
related to positive environmental attitudes.
Bernauer (1995) suggests that international issues, like many environmental problems are
less-likely to be solved when there are lower levels of confidence in social and
governmental institutions. This relationship is likely because having confidence in these
institutions and organizations means that one is more likely to believe what they tell you
with respects to the condition of the natural environment.
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Hypothesis 5.5: Non Judeo-Christian religious traditions will be more positively
related to positive environmental attitudes.
White (1967) argues that the Judeo-Christian religious traditions have a worldview which
is inconsistent with a pro-environmental worldview. Several places in Judeo-Christian
texts specify the divinely inspired relationship between man and nature. In most of these
cases, man is specified as the ruler or master of the natural world.
Hypothesis 5.6: Gender will have no significant relationship with positive
environmental attitudes.
While Kanagy and Nelsen (1995), Mohai (1992), Blocker and Eckberg (1997), and
Tarrant and Cordell (1997) have found relationships between environmental attitudes and
gender, the results have generally suggested that while women may be more concerned
about specific issues, men tend to have higher levels of general environmental concern.
This suggests that the measure of environmental concern may also play an important role
in the assessment of this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5.7: Rural respondents will have more environmental concern than
urban respondents.
Samdahl and Robertson (1989) suggest that community size is positively related to one’s
perception of environmental problems and support for change.
At the national-level, several other hypotheses emerge:
Hypothesis 5.8: Core nations should have higher average pro-environmental
attitudes than periphery or semi-periphery nations.
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As suggested by Bartley and Bergesen (1997; among others), generally the core is
associated with lower degrees of environmental degradation than the periphery.
Similarly, people in core nations, with their higher GDP per-capita are more likely to
engage in protective measures for the environment. Core nations are more likely to have
larger proportions of their populations with post-materialist values, rather than those in
peripheral nations with more materialist populations.
Hypothesis 5.9: Nations with higher average access to information will have
higher aggregate pro-environmental attitudes
Brechin and Kempton (1994) argue that experiencing environmental degradation will
increase one’s concern about it. Similarly, one should reasonably expect to develop a
similar understanding about the condition of the environment with access to outside
sources of information. Access to information is more likely to occur in wealthier core
nations, rather than in the periphery. Additionally, in terms of values, information and
communication would best be described as post-materialist rather than materialist. That
is, only once a population is able to feed, clothe, and care for themselves, will they
become concerned about communicating with others who they are not in direct regular
contact with.
Hypothesis 5.10 Lower scores on the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)
will be associated with higher aggregate pro-environmental attitudes.
Knowledge of environmental problems has been demonstrated to have influence on
environmental attitudes (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Such knowledge comes from many
sources, including the various forms of media available in a country. Based on the world-
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systems perspective, one would expect to see that those in the periphery and to a smaller
extent, the semi-periphery, are more likely to experience environmental degradation, and
that seeing the degradation first-hand would increase the likelihood of developing proenvironmental attitudes. Though core nations tend to have lower levels of degradation,
they also generally have governments that are more responsive to environmental
problems. The ESI is a composite measure that assesses a nation’s environmental wellbeing, as well as its government’s responsiveness to these problems.

DATA AND METHODS
This research uses multilevel analysis techniques that examine the effects of
individual- and national-level characteristics on two measures (one continuous, one
dichotomous) of environmental attitudes. Previous research has indicated that individual
characteristics can be useful in predicting environmental attitudes (Tarrant and Cordell
1997; Dunlap et al. 2000; Mohai 1992; Van Liere and Dunlap 1980; Jones and Dunlap
1992; Mohai 1980; Mohai and Bryant 1998; among others). Other research has suggested
that national-level characteristics may also play an important role in understanding
human-environment interaction (Bartley and Bergesen 1997; Kick, Burns, Davis,
Murray, and Murray 1996). Due to the dynamics of the modern capitalist world-system,
core nations enjoy limited environmental degradation while enjoying economic growth.
Similarly, peripheral nations experience a somewhat lesser degree of environmental
degradation than the semi-periphery. Semi-peripheral nations experience the highest
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degrees of environmental degradation as they attempt to catch up to the core by
weakening environmental regulations (Bartley and Bergesen 1997).
Because the data used in this analysis consists of individuals nested within
nations, the OLS regression assumption of independent observations is violated. A
multilevel modeling approach is therefore required, as the assumption of independent
observations is unnecessary in multilevel models. I conduct these analyses using HLM6
(Raudenbush et al. 2005). Multilevel analyses allow one to examine separately and
together, the individual and contextual effects. More specifically, HLM allows one to
estimate the error terms for each level of analysis separately.
This comparison would not be possible using OLS regression techniques because
the individual-level characteristics cannot be separated from the national-level contextual
effects. OLS regression does not easily allow one to control for contextual effects with
cross-sectional data. HLM allows one to separately analyze the individual and contextual
effects, as well as their separate variance components. This ensures that standard errors
and other statistics are as precise as possible (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Most
importantly, in this analysis, HLM highlights individual-level effects, while controlling
for national-level differences, and also national-level differences that account for
individual-level variations.
Several other decisions must be made in the specification of multilevel models.
The method of estimation can influence the results to the point of different inferences
being drawn, so the decision of which method of estimation to use is important. HLM 6
provides two methods of estimation; restricted maximum likelihood and full maximum
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likelihood. While this decision warrants much more space than is available here, full
maximum likelihood estimation was used as it provides a useful means for comparing
two models to each other via the deviance statistic (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002;
ssicentral.com). Put differently, the deviance statistic and more specifically, the change in
the deviance statistic between models hints at the explanatory power of subsequent
models to a baseline model.
Additionally, one must make a decision regarding the centering of level-1
variables. Centering these variables eases the interpretation of results by creating a
meaningful baseline (0). The centering techniques that are most often used include groupmean and grand-mean centering. In group-mean centering, the individual score is
subtracted from the average of all individuals in each level-2 unit. In grand-mean
centering, the individual score is subtracted from the mean of all cases, regardless of the
level-2 unit (Littvay 2006). Other analyses, however, can require uncentered or raw
scores.
The decision of which centering technique to use can influence the inferences
made as well as how to interpret the results. Group-mean centering allows us to examine
differences between individuals within a level-2 unit (in this case, countries) It does not,
however, allow us to assess group differences between level-2 units. Similarly, while
grand-mean centering allows us to compare level-2 units to one another, it does little for
comparing level-1 units within different clusters (Enders and Tofighi 2007). In order to
answer some of the research questions presented here, both forms of centering are
necessary. Rather than running each model both ways, I group-mean center all level-1
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variables, but include an aggregated group mean for important level-1 variables at level2. For example, after group-mean centering, I include the average age for each country as
a variable in the level-2 equation. This allows us to infer about individual-level
differences (with the group-mean centered variables) as well as group-level differences
(with the group-mean average variables) 8. Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) recommend this
practice even when one is not interested in both individual and group differences. This
technique is referred to by a variety of different names, though in essence it is required to
account for the covariance between the intercepts and slopes when group-mean centering
is used, by introducing a “contextual factor” into the model (Bickel 2007:146). Kreft and
de Leeuw (1998:110) suggest that adding the level-1 means into the level-2 model is
simply “reintroducing the means” that are removed by group-mean centering. Hox (2002)
notes that group-mean centering creates a different model than using the raw scores
(uncentered data), while grand-mean centering simply shifts the intercepts. Reintroducing
level-1 group means at level-2 helps to create a model much more similar to the original
raw score model while also shifting the intercept for easier interpretation (Hox 2002:62).
Additionally, Hox (2002), Enders and Tofighi (2007) recommend this technique any time
cross-level interactions are included in the model. As recommended by Enders and
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Unfortunately, with only 27 level-2 units, I am unable to include all of the aggregated level-1 variables in
the level-2 model. In order to ensure the quality and accuracy of the results, I entered each of the
aggregated variables one at a time to look for significance and to ensure that the variables were entered in a
meaningful way. Only the significant variables with substantive import ended up making the cut in the final
2 models. Once I had decided which variables to keep, I entered them each one at a time, in order to make
sure nothing changed. Ideally I would have enough degrees of freedom remaining that I would not need to
make these decisions or go through this process, but this was not in the cards for me this time.
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Tofighi (2007) I used grand-mean centering for all level-2 variables except for the
aggregated level-1 contextual effect variables.
Additionally, in order to answer the question about whether the variables in the
model operate differently at different levels of the core-periphery hierarchy, I have
included cross-level interactions. These interactions tell us whether the effect of an
independent variable (level-1) on the dependent variable (in this case, environmental
attitudes) is different at different values of some level-2 variable. For example, if we want
to know if the effect of political identification on environmental attitudes is different in
core countries than it is in peripheral countries, we would need a cross-level interaction
of political identification and core/periphery status.
I estimate six models to evaluate my hypotheses and research questions. First, I
specify a baseline model to determine the proportion of variance in environmental
attitudes that exists within countries (level-1) and between countries (level-2). I then
assess the differences in environmental attitudes while controlling for individual and
national-level characteristics (fixed effects models). Next, I examine the random effects
at level-2 in the random effects model. Finally, I examine the differences in
environmental attitudes while also controlling for cross-level interactions and random
effect patterns. The full level-1 (individual-level) model is provided below.
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The individual-level (e.g. level-1) data used for the current study come from the
1999-2000 wave of the World Values Survey. This is an international study conducted by
different entities in each of the nations in which data was collected. Each nation had their
own specific methods of data collection with some using simple random samples of the
population, and with others using more complex proportionally stratified sampling
design. The results are based on data from 27 countries during 1999-2000. Sample sizes
for these 27 countries ranged from 720 to 3,000 persons, making up from 2.1% to 8.5%
of the total sample, with a total sample size of N = 34,555. For a complete list of the
countries and the sample sizes for each country see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. Due to the
complexities of international data collection, and in the interest of space, I will not
describe the data collection procedures in greater detail. Information is available from the
World Values Survey website (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). For more
information regarding the World Values Survey, see the Data and Methods section of
Chapter 3.
Though missing data was only moderate (i.e. < 10% on any particular variable), I
used multiple imputation in the interest of having the most complete data possible. To
accomplish this, I used the ice module in Stata. I created five imputed datasets on which
to conduct the analyses in this section. More information about the ice module can be
found at the Stata website (http://www.statajournal.com/article.html?article=st0067_2 or
http://www.stata.com). Once the imputed dataset is created, the mim module is used in
Stata in order to allow me to analyze the five imputed datasets while reporting a single
set of results. In order to test for the inflation of significance values, I ran the analyses
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several times on each imputed dataset, as well as 5% samples of each, and then finally on
the whole dataset using the mim module. The results of these preliminary analyses
indicate that the large sample size does not artificially inflate the significance of these
findings.
Eattitudes is the shorthand measure for willingness to sacrifice, a scale measure of
environmental attitudes. The scale is created by using the sum of two items yielding a
Chronbach’s Alpha of .81. The two items contained in the scale ask the respondents:
“how strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would give part of
my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental
pollution” and; “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I
would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent
environmental pollution.” The two items used to construct the scale are coded such that a
response more favorable to the environment yields a higher score.
For the second dependent variable, economic tradeoffs, a third question asked
respondents: “Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the
environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of
view?” (1) “Protecting the environment should be given priority; even if it causes slower
economic growth and some loss of jobs” or (2) “Economic growth and creating jobs
should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.” This variable
measures environmental attitudes differently, by comparing economic tradeoffs often
required in favor of environmental protection. This variable is represented in the
equations by proenvir.
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Catholic is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 when a respondent identifies as
being Catholic. Alternatively, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Protestant and Other
represent respondents who identify as one of these respective religious traditions. They
are compared to respondents who identify as having no religious preference.
Conservative is an ordinal measure of political ideology. It ranges from “far left” at 0, to
“far right” at 10. Sex is a dichotomous measure of gender, coded as 0 = man, 1 = woman.
Urban is a dichotomous measure of urban versus rural residence, with a score of 1
representing urban residence.
Confidence is a measure of confidence in government institutions, with a higher
score indicating more confidence and a lower score indicating less. Confenvir is an
ordinal measure of confidence in the environmental movement. A higher score indicates
more confidence. Some Primary, Some Secondary, Completed Secondary, Some College,
and Completed College are dummy coded education variables. A respondent who
completed college is given a score of 1 for the completed college dummy variable, and a
0 for all else. For example, a respondent who has completed college will have a score of
1 on Completed College and a score of 0 on all of the others. The reference category for
education is “no formal education.” Income represents a categorical measure of total
income earned. A higher value indicates a higher income category.
In order to assess national-level characteristics, the required level-2 equations are
summarized below:

104

0 =
05

(

09

(

012

00

+

01

(

)+

)+
)

06

010

02

(

)+

(

(

)+
)+

011

03

07

(

014

(

015

(

017

(

019

(

)+

(

)+

(

04

(

)+

(

08

)+

)+

(

013

(

)+
)+
)+
)+

(

016

)+
)+

)+

1 =

10

+

11 (

020

)+

018

(

)+

(

)+

12 (

)+

0

1

.
.
.

9 =

90

91 (

+

)+

92 (

)+

9

.
.
.
.

21 =

210

+

211 (

)+

212 (

)+

21

The national-level (e.g. level-2) data used for this analysis come from a variety of
sources. Primarily, I use data from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World
Factbook (cia.gov). I do, however also include measures from the Environmental
Sustainability Index (ESI). The ESI is an attempt to develop a composite measure of
overall environmental performance of most nations by aggregating known information on
environmental degradation, policy, and participation in international treaties on the
environment. It is collaboration between the World Economic Forum, the Yale Center for
Environmental Law and Policy, and the Center for International Earth Science
Information Network (CIESIN), at Columbia University
(http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/). These data cover the year 2000.
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At level 2, ESI represents the nation’s score on the Environmental Sustainability
Index (ESI). A higher score represents a nation with a government and industry that is
more responsive to environmental degradation, among other things. Agricult represents
the proportion of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is made up of the
agricultural sector. Industry represents the proportion of the nation’s GDP that is made up
of the industrial sector. Services represents the proportion of the nation’s GDP that is
made up of the service sector. Landline represents the number of landline telephones percapita within a country. It is used as a proxy measure for the degree of contact with others
both in and outside of a country. Monarchy, Communist, and Othergov represent dummy
variables for the type of government of a country. The reference category for these
variables is “republic.”
Semiper represents a nation’s position in the world-system core-periphery
hierarchy. A score of 1 on semiper indicates a semiperipheral nation. Per indicates
whether (1) or not (0) a nation is peripheral. Proportion Woman represents the aggregate
gender makeup from level-1. Average subjective social class represents the average
subjective social class from level-1. Average Confidence in Govt Institutions and Average
Confidence in the Environmental Movement represent the aggregate levels of confidence
in these two institutions at level-1. Average Some Primary Ed represents the proportion
of respondents in a country with some primary education. Similarly, Average Some
Secondary Ed, Average Completed Secondary Ed, Average Some College, and Average
Completed College represent the proportion within each country that has attained each
level of education. Average Income represents the average level-1 income.
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FINDINGS
The two models examine the effects of both individual and national-level
characteristics on environmental attitudes (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) by using two different
dependent variables. The first model examines the scale measurement of environmental
attitudes (willingness to sacrifice), while the second model examines the dichotomous
outcome variable (economic tradeoffs). This difference requires two separate statistical
techniques be used, even within the context of HLM. The first model produces results
similar to OLS regression techniques, assuming a normal distribution of the outcome
variable. The second model requires the use of a Bernoulli distribution on the outcome
variable, that is, a dichotomous outcome.

Model 1: Willingness to Sacrifice Scale
Hierarchical Linear Modeling allows coefficients to be interpreted in roughly the
same manner as most OLS results. For example, with all else being held constant, for
each one unit increase in education environmental attitudes are expected to decrease by .08. This makes the results simple to interpret, though it should not belie the complexities
of what this analysis is actually telling us.
At the individual level (i.e. level-1), many of the findings of main effects are
similar to the findings in Chapter 3. Some findings however are quite different. As
shown in Model 5 (Table 5.1), when compared to those who do not identify as belonging
to a religious tradition, Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Jews, Muslims,
Buddhists, Hindus, and those identifying as some “other” religion are no different. This
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indicates that even after controlling for other factors, certain religious beliefs are not
associated with environmental concern. Additionally, there are some significant crosslevel interactions (Model 6 – Table 5.1). Muslims in the semi-periphery have lower levels
of environmental concern as illustrated in Figure 5.3. In other words, Muslims in semiperipheral nations have lower levels of environmental concern than Muslims in core
nations. Similarly, Hindu’s in the semi-periphery have lower environmental attitudes than
those in other world-system positions, as illustrated in figure 5.3. Buddhists however
have higher environmental attitudes in the periphery than in other world-system
positions. Put differently, Buddhists in peripheral nations have higher environmental
attitudes than Buddhists in the core. Additionally, the variance components (Model 5,
Table 5.1) for Catholic, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and those who identify as some
other religion are statistically significant, indicating that there is significant differences
between nations (level-2 units) in the effects of these variables. This partially explains the
lack of significant main effects of religious affiliation, as the effects vary by country,
essentially cancelling the effects of such affiliation.
In contrast to the findings in Chapter 3, however, political conservatism is not
associated with environmental attitudes (Table 5.1). On the other hand, women have
lower environmental attitudes than did men (-.075). Age is not a significant predictor of
environmental attitudes. Unlike the finding in Chapter 3, urban residents are no different
from rural residents with regards to environmental attitudes. There is a significant
interaction between women and peripheral and semi-peripheral world-system positions,
indicating that women in the periphery and semi-periphery have lower environmental
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attitudes than women in the core. A plot of these interaction effects is provided in figures
5.4. The variance in the effects of political ideology, sex, age, and urban residence are
significant, indicating that the effects of these factors on environmental attitudes varied
by the national level context.
A one unit increase in subjective social class corresponds to a .11 unit increase in
environmental attitudes (Model 5). Also, the different dummy variables for education
indicated that higher levels of education are associated with more pro-environmental
attitudes than lower levels of education. Having some primary education only is
associated with a .131 unit change in environmental attitudes when compared to having
no formal education. Having some secondary education only is associated with a .260
unit increase in environmental attitudes. Completing secondary education only is
associated with a .317 unit increase in environmental attitudes, while attending some
college only is associated with a .364 unit increase in environmental attitudes. Lastly,
completing college is associated with a .457 unit increase in environmental attitudes.
Income is not associated with any difference in environmental attitudes. These findings
mirror the results of the analysis in Chapter 3.
Cross-level interactions between some primary education, some secondary
education, and some college with peripheral world-system position are significant as
well. Some primary education has a negative -.420 unit effect on environmental attitudes
in peripheral nations, Some secondary education has a negative -.408 unit effect on
environmental attitudes in the periphery, and some college education has a negative .333
unit effect in the periphery. The effects of these interactions are illustrated in Figure 5.5.
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Put differently, respondents in the periphery with some primary education, some
secondary education, or some college education are less concerned about the environment
than those with similar levels of education in the core. The variance components of
completed college education, completed secondary education, and some primary
education are significant indicating that the effects of these variables on environmental
attitudes vary between countries. The same is true of subjective social class.
Confidence in government institutions has a positive effect on environmental
attitudes. For a one unit change in confidence in government institutions, environmental
attitudes are expected to increase by .09 units. Similarly, confidence in the environmental
movement has a stronger positive effect on environmental attitudes. For a one unit
change in confidence in the environmental movement, holding all else constant,
environmental attitudes is expected to increase by .24 units. The variance components in
Model 5 indicate that the effect of confidence in both government institutions and the
environmental movement varied significantly among the countries in the sample.
There are some important main effects at the national level (i.e. level-2) as well.
National scores on the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) are not associated with
changes in environmental attitudes. Additionally, the type of government of a nation has
an impact on the environmental attitudes of its citizens. When compared to republics,
monarchies have lower environmental attitudes. Monarchist governments are associated
with a -.73 unit decrease in environmental attitudes. Communist governments and other
types of governments are associated with higher environmental attitudes. Communist
governments, holding all else equal, are associated with a .79 unit increase in
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environmental attitudes. Other forms of government, holding all else equal, are associated
with a .44 unit increase in environmental attitudes.
The percent of the nation’s GDP comprised of the service sector is positively
associated with environmental attitudes. That is, a one unit change in the percent GDP
comprised of the service sector is associated with a .02 unit increase in average
environmental attitudes in a nation. Additionally, the number of landline telephones percapita is negatively associated with environmental attitudes (-.05).
Finally, the results for world-system position suggest mixed results. When
compared to core nations, semi-peripheral nations have lower environmental attitudes.
Specifically, semi-peripheral nations are associated with a -.43 unit decrease in
willingness to sacrifice. Peripheral nations are significantly more likely to have higher
degrees of willingness to sacrifice than core nations9. Specifically, peripheral nations are
associated with a .28 unit increase in environmental attitudes. This finding is indicative of
the inverted “U” shape of environmental concern with the semi-periphery having the
lowest levels of concern as suggested by Bartley and Bergesen (1997).
Group differences between countries are assessed by examining the aggregated
level-1 variables for some characteristics. The proportion of a population that is
comprised of women is associated with a -5.8 unit decrease in environmental attitudes on
average within countries. This indicates that there are significant differences among
countries with regards to the effect of gender on environmental attitudes. Similarly,
9

Additional analyses indicate that peripheral nations are significantly different than semi-peripheral nations
as well. The DV is a scale measure of environmental attitudes ranging from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most
concerned about the environment.
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average subjective social class, average income, and the proportions of the population
with each level of education indicate some significant variation between countries (with
the exception of the proportion of respondents who have completed some college).
Subjective social class is associated with a -1.6 unit decrease in average environmental
attitudes, while average income is associated with a -.26 unit decrease in environmental
attitudes. The proportion with some primary education only is associated with a 3.6 unit
increase in environmental attitudes, while the proportion completing college is associated
with a 9.6 unit increase in environmental attitudes. Lastly, the average confidence in
government institutions and the average confidence in the environmental movement are
associated with a .77 and -0.9 unit change in average environmental attitudes
respectively.
An examination of the variance components of Models 5 and 6 indicate some
interesting effects. The inclusion of cross-level interactions makes all of the variance
components statistically significant. In fact, where they are barely significant in Model 5,
they are now more significant in Model 6. Overall, this suggests that there is something
about the country (level-2 unit), rather than the individual that contributes to
environmental attitudes. While the ICC suggests that only about 3% of the variation in
environmental attitudes is at level-2, this finding perhaps points to the variables for which
this effect exists.
Overall, these results are relatively consistent with the findings in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4. About 97% of the variation in individual environmental attitudes is found
within countries, with about 3% of the variation in individual environmental attitudes is
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due to national level variation. This is computed by calculating the Intraclass correlation
coefficient (ICC), which is summarized as follows:

In short, the ICC represents the variance within level-2 units divided by the total variance
(level-1 plus level-2). The full results of Model 1 are presented in Table 5.1.
The deviance statistics of each of the six models indicate that the final model
(Model 6, Table 5.1) is the best fit to the data, though it is not significantly better than
Model 5. The statistical significance of most level-2 variables and most of the variance
components indicate that much of the model fit is improved by accounting for nationallevel variation in environmental attitudes.
Additional calculations are required to compare the multilevel model to the
individual-level model (Chapter 3) in terms of the proportions of variance explained.
Though HLM6 does not provide any of these statistics, many can be calculated by hand.
In order to compare the approximate r-squared of the individual model to the multilevel
model, I computed the proportion of variance explained in each model. The overall
changes are indicative of a better model.
Compared to the baseline (null) model, model 2—the model with no interactions
and no socioeconomic status variables—explains about 5.5% of the level-1 variance,
about 58% of the level-2 variance and about 9.2% of the overall variance. Model 3—the
model with cross-level interactions but no SES variables—these proportions change and
provide about 5.6% of the variance at level-1, 63.5% of the level-2 variance, and about
9.6% of the overall variance. Model 4—the fixed effects model, with no interactions and
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no variance components—about 4.8% of the level-1variance is explained, about 77.4% of
the level-2 variance, and about 10% of the overall variance explained. In Model 5, the
main effects model, about 7.3% of the variance at level-1 is explained, while about 61.5%
of the variance at level-2 is explained with about 11.1% of the overall variance being
explained. The final model explains about 7.3% of the level-1 variance, about 64.7% of
the level-2 variance, and about 11.4% of the overall variance is explained. Overall, this
indicates that the multilevel model explains more of the variation in environmental
attitudes than the individual-level model does, and that the final model (Model 6)
explains more variance than previous models.
The results indicate many significant effects of social class. An additional set of
models were developed to assess these effects specifically. When used alone, subjective
social class, education, and income accounts for about 1.8% of the variance in level-1
willingness to sacrifice. While small, this still amounts for a relatively large portion of the
level-1 variance. These results indicate, above all else, the impact of social class. This
finding is consistent with the post-materialist thesis in that those with higher socioeconomic statuses have higher pro-environmental attitudes.

Model 2: Economic Tradeoffs
The second analysis uses a dichotomous measure of environmental attitudes.
Dichotomous outcomes violate the assumption of normality in OLS approaches to data
analysis. In order to overcome this limitation, logistic regression is generally the
appropriate analytic procedure. If we are to understand how both individual- and
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national-level characteristics are associated with environmental attitudes, however, a
multilevel approach is necessary. With HLM, this comes in the form of the Bernoulli
outcome. In addition to the usual output, HLM also provides odds-ratios, which are
useful for comparing the change in the likelihood of one outcome over another for
respondents with a certain characteristic.
When conducting analyses with HLM and using Bernoulli outcomes, one must
also choose between unit-specific and population-average model results. According to
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002:303-304), the unit-specific model “describes a process that
is occurring in each level-2 unit [i.e. countries] [. . .] of central interest is the question of
how these processes differ over a population of level-2 units;” whereas the populationaverage “results can be deduced as one characteristic of the distribution of the unitspecific results.” For the results present here, I use the unit-specific model output, as I am
more interested in the differences between nations, than the average effects of level-1
units (e.g. individuals) across level-2 units (e.g. nations). The results of this analysis are
provided in Table 5.2.
Similar to the individual-level analysis conducted in Chapter 3, confidence in the
environmental movement remains a statistically significant predictor of environmental
attitudes. Respondents with higher degrees of confidence in the environmental movement
are 1.3 times more likely to have more pro-environmental attitudes than those who have
less confidence in the environmental movement. Confidence in government institutions is
not a significant predictor of environmental attitudes, as it was not in Chapter 3.
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Respondents with higher incomes are no more likely to favor environmental
protection over economic growth than those with lower incomes. Unlike in Chapter 3,
however, subjective social class is not a significant predictor of environmental attitudes.
The effect for education is similar in the multilevel model; respondents who have
completed secondary education, some college, or completed college are progressively
more likely to favor the environment over economic growth than those with no
education10. Specifically, those who have completed secondary education are 1.28 times
more likely than those with no formal education to favor the environment; those who
have some college education are 46% more likely to favor the environment over
economic growth; while those who have completed college are almost 1.7 times more
likely to favor environmental protection over economic growth.
Age is not a significant predictor of environmental attitudes in this model.
Women are about 6% less likely to favor the environment over economic growth than
men, and urban residents are no different from rural residents in their environmental
attitudes. Politically right wing respondents are slightly less likely than left wing
respondents to favor the environment over the economy. Hindu, Muslim, Catholic,
Protestant, Orthodox Christian, and Buddhist respondents are no more likely to favor
environmental protection over economic growth than those with no religious preference,
while Jews are about 32% less likely than those with no religious preference. Those who

10

Additional analyses indicate that respondents who had completed secondary education, some
college, or completed college are significantly different from those who had no formal education,
as well as those who had not completed secondary education.
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identify as some other religion are about 1% less likely to favor environmental protection
over economic growth.
At the national-level (e.g. level-2), having access to a landline telephone is a
significant predictor of environmental attitudes. More specifically, respondents from
nations with a more landline telephones per-capita are about 7% less likely to favor the
environment over economic growth on average. World-system position is also negatively
related to environmental attitudes. Respondents in semi-peripheral nations are about 38%
less likely to favor the environment over economic growth than core nations, while
respondents in peripheral nations are about 45% less likely to favor the environment on
average. Additionally, respondents with higher incomes are about 24% less likely to
favor the environment over economic growth than are respondents with lower incomes.
The composition of the various sectors of the economy also has an important effect on
environmental attitudes. Nations with a higher percent of their GDP comprised of the
agricultural sector are about 2% more likely to favor the environment over economic
growth, while nations with a higher percent of their GDP comprised of the service sector
are about 1.5% more likely to favor the environment.
The type of government of a country is also a significant predictor of
environmental attitudes. Countries with Monarchist governments are about 31% less
likely to favor the environment over economic growth. Communist governments, on the
other hand, are about 46% more likely to favor the environment over economic growth.
Additionally, the average subjective social class of a nation is related to the average level
of environmental concern of its respondents. Specifically, higher average subjective
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social class is associated with a 52% lower likelihood of favoring environmental
protection over economic growth.
Several interesting cross-level interactions are also observed (Model 4 -Table
5.2). The effects of religion on environmental attitudes appear to have considerable
variation between nations. Catholics in the semi-periphery are about 21% more likely to
favor environmental protection over economic development than Catholics in core
countries (see Figure 5.6). Orthodox Christians in the semi-periphery are about 44% less
likely to favor environmental protection than Orthodox Christians in the core. Muslims in
the periphery are 180% more likely to favor the environment than Muslims in core
countries. Additionally, Muslims in the semi-periphery are about 73% more likely to
favor the environment over economic growth than Muslims in the core. Respondents who
identified as some “Other” religion in the semi-periphery are 1.5 times more likely to
favor the environment than their counterparts in the core while their peripheral
counterparts are twice as likely as those in the core to favor the environment over the
economy. Finally, those with higher degrees of confidence in government institutions in
the periphery are about 18% more likely to favor the environment than their core
counterparts (see Figure 5.7), while those with more confidence in the environmental
movement in the semi-periphery are about 7% less-likely to favor the environment over
the economy than their core counterparts.
Additionally, the variance components (Model 3 - Table 5.2) highlight some
important differences in the effects of certain variables in different countries. Among the
effects of religious affiliation, Muslims, Catholics, Hindus, and those with some other
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affiliation have significant variance components, suggesting that the effects of these
variables may have differing effects on environmental attitudes between countries.
Political ideology, age, subjective social class, and income also have significant variation
in their effects in different countries. Overall, this explains why some of these variables
are non-significant in the models presented above. In particular, this is potentially
because the differences in these effects may cancel one another out when comparing
countries.
When using Bernoulli outcomes certain statistics are unavailable. A proportion of
variance explained is only available for the level-2 effects. As noted in Raudenbush and
Bryk (2002:309) this can be computed by taking the variance components at level-2 from
the null model and subtracting the other model variance components from it. This number
is then divided by the null model variance once more. The results show that 84% of the
level-2 variance in Model 1, 81% of the level-2 variance in Model 3, and 82% of the
level-2 variance in Model 4 is explained. This indicates that the cross-level interactions
were necessary to include.
Overall, the results of the second analysis indicate that social class is a significant
correlate of environmental attitudes, though the effects are in some cases different than
they are in the first analysis. This again supports the post-materialist perspective, and
highlights the importance of the two different measures of environmental attitudes.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results suggest several important conclusions about the factors which
influence environmental attitudes. Hypothesis 5.1 proposes that higher social class
standing will be positively related to pro-environmental attitudes. In the first model,
subjective social class and education are both significant predictors of environmental
attitudes, however income is not. This may be due to the way in which income is coded,
or the fact that it is really only the income of the respondent, and not the total family
income. In the second model, however, only education is a significant predictor of
environmental attitudes. Overall this indicates that social class is related to environmental
attitudes, though some measures of social class, such as subjective social class and
education may be more useful. Additionally, the variance components of the first model
indicates that, at least at some levels of education, variance in the effect of country-level
education may be more important than the actual level of education at the individual
level.
Hypothesis 5.2 proposes that age will be positively related to pro-environmental
attitudes. Both multilevel analyses have failed to confirm this hypothesis. In other words,
environmental attitudes appear to be similar, regardless of the age of the respondent. The
significant variance components of age in both models suggest that the variance in age is
likely related to national-level characteristics, rather than individual-level characteristics.
In other words, the effect of age could be different in two countries. In preliminary
analyses, the effects of age on environmental attitudes varied greatly. Where some
countries have strong and obvious negative associations between attitudes and age, others
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have relatively strong positive associations. This supports the post-materialist thesis in
that post-material values are said to exhibit a generational effect, though I do not assess
differences in generations, only actual age.
Hypothesis 5.3 claims that political conservatism (i.e. politically right wing) is
negatively related to pro-environmental attitudes. In the first analysis, this hypothesis is
not supported, but in the second it is. This indicates that the way we measure
environmental attitudes may play an important role in whether or not political
conservatism has an impact on the formation of environmental attitudes. Additionally the
variance components of both models indicate that the variance in the effect of political
ideology on environmental attitudes may be related to differences in the conceptions of
political ideology in each country. Preliminary analyses show the different slopes of
political ideologies’ effect on environmental attitudes. Again, it is clear that there is
considerable variation among nations. For example, in some nations being right wing is
associated with lower environmental attitudes, while in some countries the opposite is
true. Again, this finding is consistent with the post-materialist thesis in that political
attitudes may reflect a generational pattern differently among the populations of various
nations.
Hypothesis 5.4 proposes that confidence in social/governmental institutions will
be positively related to pro-environmental attitudes. The first analysis confirms this
hypothesis, while the second fails to do so, at least for confidence in government
institutions. For confidence in the environmental movement, both models indicate
support for this hypothesis (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Overall this suggests that confidence in
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government institutions and in the environmental movement are significant predictors of
environmental attitudes.
Hypothesis 5.5 suggests that non Judeo-Christian religious traditions will be more
positively related to pro-environmental attitudes. While there are some differences by
religious tradition, it is difficult to confirm this hypothesis based on these findings. It
appears that the measure used to assess environmental attitudes might matter even more
than the religious affiliation of the respondent as religion is much less significant in the
first model than the second. The cross-level interactions by religious group indicate that
world-system position may have different effects on environmental attitudes in different
countries. For example, in the first model, semi-peripheral Muslims appear to have lower
environmental attitudes than Muslims in the core (as illustrated in Figures 5.3 and 5.6). In
the second model, however, they are more likely to favor environmental protection over
economic growth than Muslims in the core. This suggests the underlying difference in
these two distinct measures of environmental attitudes. The variance components of both
models indicate that this variance may be more related to national-level characteristics
than individual-level characteristics.
Hypothesis 5.6 proposes that gender will not be a significant predictor of
environmental attitudes. This hypothesis is not supported as there are differences in
environmental attitudes between women and men. Both models indicate that women are
less concerned about the environment than men. Preliminary analyses indicate this
pattern by showing the environmental attitudes of all countries as they are modified by
gender. Cross-level interactions indicate that women in semi-peripheral and peripheral
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countries have lower levels of environmental concern than their counterparts in core
nations (Figure 5.4).
Hypothesis 5.7 suggests that rural respondents will have a positive association
with pro-environmental attitudes. The analyses indicate that rural and urban respondents
are no different from one another. The models did not support this hypothesis because
there is no association between rural/urban and pro-environmental attitudes. The variance
components of both models, however, indicate that the variance in environmental
attitudes associated with urban-rural residence can be attributed to national-level
characteristics rather than individual-level characteristics.
Among the results for national-level characteristics, hypothesis 5.8 proposes that a
higher world-system position will be related to more pro-environmental attitudes. Even
though there is some evidence to suggest that this may be partially supported, there do
not appear to be any consistent differences between the different measures of
environmental attitudes. With that said, peripheral nations tend to have lower
environmental attitudes than do core countries in Model 2, and semi-peripheral countries
have lower environmental attitudes in both models. Where this hypothesis finds its best
support is in the cross-level interactions. Overall, these findings appear to offer limited
support for the post-materialist thesis in that the measure of environmental attitudes
appears to affect the relationship between attitudes and world-system position.
Hypothesis 5.9 suggests that access to outside sources of information will be
negatively related to pro-environmental attitudes. The results for this hypothesis indicate
that this effect is as expected. In the scaled measure of environmental attitudes, the
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proportion of respondents with a landline telephone is a significant predictor of
environmental attitudes, indicating that as the number of landline telephones per-capita in
a country increased, environmental attitudes decreased. Specifically, a one unit change in
the number of landline telephones per-capita is associated with a .05 unit decrease in the
willingness to sacrifice. In the dichotomous measure of environmental attitudes the same
is true. Specifically, countries with a higher number of landline phones per-capita are
about 7% less likely to favor environmental protection over economic growth. This
finding is inconsistent with the post-materialist thesis in that one should expect that
access to outside information should be related to higher environmental attitudes scores,
rather than lower.
Hypothesis 5.10 proposes that the ESI score will be negatively associated with
pro-environmental attitudes. The results do not indicate support for this hypothesis. In
both analyses, ESI score is not a significant predictor of environmental attitudes. In other
words, the degree of degradation and government responsiveness to degradation in a
nation is not associated with the attitudes of the population of that nation.
Overall, these findings show support or partial support for six of the ten
hypotheses. More specifically, they indicate that political conservatism, confidence in
social and governmental institutions, social class, access to outside information, gender,
world-system position, and education are significant predictors of environmental
attitudes. Furthermore, age, religion, and rural/urban residence have little or no consistent
effect on environmental attitudes. This may be due to significant variations between
countries on these variables, though other explanations may exist as well.
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Additionally, with regards to the specific research questions posed for these
analyses, several important findings can be pointed out. Do individual- or national- level
characteristics better explain aggregate levels of environmental concern? An
examination of the variance components of these models indicates that individual-level
characteristics account for more of the variance (about 97%) in environmental attitudes,
the national-level characteristics account for about 3% of the variance. While the 3%
between-country variance is a relatively small portion of the overall variance, it is 3% of
the variance that is relatively easily explained by the characteristics of the nation being
studied. In fact, the final model for willingness to sacrifice explains about 65% of the
level-2 variance. This same model explains about 7.3% of the level-1 variance and an
overall 11.4% of the variance. When compared to the individual-level model in Chapter
3, this is a significant improvement.
Second, do these differences apply across all levels of the core-periphery
hierarchy? It appears that yes, they do apply across all levels of the core-periphery
hierarchy. However, there are several important differences in certain variables such as
religion, and education. This is important to note, as it appears that the effect of the
position of a country in the modern world-system is likely to impact specific
characteristics like religious beliefs but not the overall differences between respondents’
attitudes. In additional models, world-system position did not significantly explain
environmental attitudes by itself. It does, however, explain a significant portion of the
variance in environmental attitudes once you include individual (level-1) characteristics.
Overall this is substantial support for the world-systems perspective in that environmental
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attitudes have not been shown to be significantly related to world-system position in
previous research.
Finally, if there are differences between individuals in different nations in terms
of environmental attitudes, on which characteristics do they vary? Though cross-level
interactions only significantly predicted core-periphery hierarchy differences among
countries for a handful of variables, these variables could have a significant impact on
our understanding of environmental attitudes. First, Muslim respondents exhibited some
variation in attitudes depending upon where their country fell in the core-periphery
hierarchy. Second, Hindus and Buddhists exhibited a similar pattern, as did Jewish
respondents in the second analysis. Women have lower environmental attitudes than men
overall, but women in non-core countries have increasingly lower environmental attitudes
than women in the core. Confidence in government institutions is modified by worldsystem position in the second model. Specifically, those with more confidence in the
government in peripheral nations have an 18% higher chance of choosing to protect the
environment over economic growth. Lastly, education, particularly for the education
categories that did not mark completion of a certain level (i.e. “some primary,” “some
secondary,” and “some college” are impacted by world-system position. Specifically,
they are associated negatively with environmental attitudes when compared to their
counterparts in the core.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
In the previous chapters I have presented three analyses designed to shed some
light on both individual-level and national-level characteristics that influence
environmental attitudes internationally. While each of the analyses allows some
important conclusions to be drawn, I believe that the biggest impact of this research is in
the combined results. In this chapter, I will first reiterate the most important findings
from the three analyses, while situating these results into the theoretical frameworks
discussed in Chapter 2. Second, I will discuss these findings and their theoretical
implications in an effort to situate this research within the field of environmental
sociology. Finally, I will discuss the limitations of each of the analyses and discuss future
directions for research on the topic of international environmental attitudes.

KEY FINDINGS
The preceding analyses have highlighted several important findings. At the
individual-level, the previously observed correlates of environmental concern explain a
significant portion of its variation. At the national-level, the importance of measurement
of environmental attitudes is highlighted. The multilevel models demonstrate how these
individual-level and national-level differences interact with one another to help highlight
some factors influencing environmental attitudes, while minimizing others. Here, I will
restate the important conclusions from each analysis, while framing the results in the
theoretical contexts used to develop the analysis, the world-systems perspective and the
New Ecological Paradigm (NEP).
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Individual-Level
The individual-level analysis conducted in Chapter 3 helps to demonstrate the
small effects of previously hypothesized correlates of environmental attitudes. While
these effects may be indicative of weak theoretical guidance, it is more likely that they
reflect the unapparent complexity of environmental attitude formation. Specifically, the
findings suggest three important things about explaining environmental attitudes by
individual characteristics: (1) social class appears to have an important impact on
environmental attitudes, though how social class is measured appears to be an important
determinant of exactly how this relationship operates; (2) confidence in social and/or
governmental institutions seems to influence environmental attitudes, but in some
instances, not in the way one might expect; and (3) there is evidence that religious beliefs
play a role in the development of these attitudes as well, though the role religion plays
may be difficult to precisely capture.
In order to accurately characterize the nature of the social class—attitude
relationship, it must be discussed in its component parts. In these analyses, the measures
of social class included income, education, and subjective social class. Income proved not
to be a correlate of environmental attitudes regardless of how environmental attitudes
were conceptualized. Subjective social class proved to have a significant effect on
environmental attitudes, indicating that the higher the subjective social class, the more
positive the environmental attitudes. In the OLS model (DV = Willingness to Sacrifice),
education is significantly related to environmental attitudes, as hypothesized, indicating
that more education is associated with pro-environmental attitudes. In the Logistic
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regression model, the impact of education on environmental attitudes is progressively
stronger as education increases, after one finishes secondary school. For respondents with
less than a secondary school education, there is no significant difference when compared
to respondents with no formal education.
It appears that the impact of social class may have several possible explanations.
First, the manner in which social class is conceptualized cannot be understated (Bollen et
al. 2001). In fact, often times conceptualizing social class in one way or another can
create problems when it comes to the comparability of findings in two or more studies.
Though I attempted to overcome this difficulty by including three distinct measures of
social class (subjective social class, income, and education), one of the most common
measures of social class (income) had no significant effect in any of the final models.
Education and subjective social class however were important correlates of
environmental attitudes. Second, we turn to the hypothesized relationship between social
class and environmental attitudes. That is, social class position is positively related to
environmental attitudes. The results of this analysis indicate support for such a pattern,
but they are unable to explain this relationship. Van Liere and Dunlap (1980:183)
propose that this relationship exists because upper and middle classes have “solved their
basic material needs and thus are free to focus on the more aesthetic aspects of human
existence.” Additionally, they note that this pattern may reflect “relative,” rather than
“absolute” deprivation in that the wealthy tend to live in nicer places, with less personal
interaction with environmental degradation, and so when they see it they recognize it for
what it is. Conversely, the poor live, work, and participate in recreational activities in
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poorer, dirtier areas, and so they see this as a norm. Post-materialism posits that this
relationship is what is expected as well.
Having confidence in social and government institutions appears to have at least a
moderate effect on environmental attitudes. As Bernauer (1995) suggests, international
problems are less likely to be solved when there are lower levels of confidence in social
and governmental institutions. Though the effects are moderate, the results of this
analysis appear to support this hypothesis, with higher levels of confidence in
government and the environmental movement being positively related to environmental
attitudes. The logistic regression model for economic tradeoffs indicates that confidence
in government institutions has no significant impact on environmental attitudes.
An explanation of this pattern is that by having confidence in governmental
institutions or the environmental movement, one is more likely to trust them when they
point to problems with the environment. Likewise, when one lives in a nation with a
corrupt government, or a less-than-credible environmental movement, they are less likely
to take the word of these institutions. This is especially important today during the era of
“climate-gate,” during which the computers of the University of East Anglia’s (UEA)
Climatic Research Unit (CRU) were hacked. The aftermath has led to allegations by
climate change skeptics that the hacked emails pointed to scientific and academic
misconduct within the climate science community. Media outlets failed to report on the
inaccurate sensationalism originally presented, even though several independent
committees revealed the claim of misconduct to be untrue through subsequent
examinations of the materials. The effect of this particular example remains to be seen,
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though if the results of the present study hold true, the decline in confidence in the
environmental movement and even the government, should the government choose to
take a global warming standpoint, could negatively impact environmental attitudes.
Religious beliefs appear to be significant predictors of environmental attitudes,
though the means of assessing these attitudes determines the effect. In the OLS model,
Catholics, Hindus, Protestants, and those of some other religion are less likely than those
who do not identify with a religious tradition to have pro-environmental attitudes.
Conversely, Orthodox Christians are more likely than those with no religious tradition to
have pro-environmental attitudes. In the Logistic regression model, all religious traditions
but Catholics and Hindus are significantly less likely to favor environmental protection
over economic growth than those with no religious tradition. Catholics and Hindus are no
different from those with no religious tradition. This difference in results between models
suggests that how environmental attitudes are conceptualized and measured can have an
important effect on the findings. A similar effect was noted on the effect of gender, with
women being less concerned than men.
Though more recent studies have noted gender differences (McCright 2010;
Blocker and Eckberg 1997) in environmental concern, they generally measure
environmental concern differently from one another. For example, Aaron McCright
(2010) examines gender differences in scientific knowledge and concern over global
climate change. The findings indicate that women express slightly greater concern about
climate change than do men, while also having a higher level of scientific knowledge
regarding climate change than do men. Unfortunately, these results may reflect the
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author’s assessment of climate change attitudes, rather than environmental attitudes
overall. Similarly, Tarrant and Cordell (1997) find that women have a stronger
relationship with environmental concern, though they note that the method of measuring
environmental concern made a difference. It has been suggested that the difference lies in
the perception of individual vulnerability to the risks associated with environmental
problems (Bord and O’Connor 1997). That is, women recognize the risk associated with
not acting about specific environmental issues more than men, and so they are more
easily concerned about it. Therefore, when the measure of environmental attitudes is
more vague and does not point to a specific problem, men are likely to show more
concern.

National-Level
The national-level analysis conducted in Chapter 4 highlights some interesting
patterns as well. The results suggest several important findings: (1) the Environmental
Sustainability Index (ESI) score is negatively related to willingness to sacrifice for core,
periphery, and semi-peripheral nations, though ESI is positively associated to the
economic tradeoffs measure only for core nations; (2) access to outside sources of
information is impacted by position in the core-periphery hierarchy, however the pattern
exists to such an extent that few of the conclusions regarding these findings are useful;
and (3) the makeup of the economy in a nation has an impact on the environmental
attitudes, and even more specifically, with the position of a nation in the core-peripheral
hierarchy.
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While the ESI is negatively associated with willingness to sacrifice, this pattern is
not true of economic tradeoffs. Specifically, this pattern is only true for core nations; all
non-core nations are negatively associated with both measures of environmental attitudes.
Primarily this begs a question regarding the consistency of the two measures of
environmental attitudes, though this question appears to be a relatively obvious one. Less
obvious, however is a question about why this pattern exists for core nations? One
potential answer is that core nations share some important features that non-core nations
generally do not.
First, core nations are characterized as being the nations with the highest levels of
technological advancement and highly industrialized (or post-industrial) economies
(Wallerstein 1990). Additionally, they often share the characterization of being
exploitative of the non-core. Why then, would wealthy nations with high levels of
technical advancement exhibit a difference between their ESI score and their
environmental attitudes that did not exist among less wealthy countries? One explanation
is that the level of technological advancement allows a more efficient degradation of the
environment, minimizing the overall impact of such degradation. Additionally, as
suggested by Jorgenson (Forthcoming), core nations often export the consequences of
such degradation to the non-core11. This is done by providing an international market
with a ready consumer of resource and pollution intensive practices like mining, logging,
and agriculture.

11

Note that I am not making the claim that environmental degradation is not obvious in the core.
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Another explanation of this pattern is that the governments are so much more
responsive to environmental degradation that these problems are generally less serious
than they would be in a country in the periphery with a less-responsive government who
participates in fewer international environmental treaties, etc12. As Brechin and Kempton
(1994) note, environmental attitudes should be influenced by the visibility of
environmental issues to a certain population. We should, therefore, expect to see less
concern among core nations who would be more likely to have implemented measures to
minimize the impacts of environmental degradation or at the very least, to ensure that
they happen in less visible places (including other countries).
Access to outside sources of information was expected to be related to
environmental attitudes because it was assumed, based on Brechin and Kempton (1994),
that access to outside information would increase the visibility of such environmental
degradation, thereby increasing the concern among people. Though there was certainly
some evidence to suggest that this pattern exists, the differences between nations in the
core-periphery hierarchy overshadow any overall trends. This pattern reflects on all of the
measures of access to outside sources of information: (1) cellular telephones per-capita,
(2) internet users per-capita, (3) television sets per-capita, and (4) landline telephones
per-capita, though the number of landline phones per-capita was the only variable that
had a consistent effect across measures.

12

I write this with full knowledge of the continuing oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico. However, I do not think
that this instance necessarily negates the argument, as one can imagine how much worse this leak might
have been if it had happened in the gulf of Mexico to a peripheral nation’s oil company, which would not
have had the resources necessary to minimize the effects to the extent American companies have been able
to do at this point.
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In the U.S., methodologists have recognized the effect of using landline
telephones in studies, as the number of cellular-only households grows. But this effect is
likely nonexistent in the periphery and semi-periphery, as access to a landline telephone
can be difficult enough. Television is no longer relied upon for information in the core
(where it is generally for entertainment), it may be more difficult to find consistent access
to a television in most of the periphery and semi-periphery, minimizing its impact as a
source of information. Landline telephones, however, remain a necessary medium of
communication internationally. It has been demonstrated that even though access to a
variety of newer means of communication has grown overall, the gap between wealthy
and poor countries has grown (Rodriguez and Wilson 2000). Though a relationship has
been demonstrated between economic performance and access to information and
communication technologies (ITCs), it is generally held that the effects of such
technologies will be observed in the long run (Rodriguez and Wilson 2000). Put
differently, poorer nations are just now beginning to see the effects of such ICTs, so an
analysis of more recent data would be required to observe any effects.
Finally, the composition of the economy effects a country’s position in the worldeconomy (e.g. world-system position), while the position in the core-periphery hierarchy
is negatively related to willingness to sacrifice in all but core nations. World-system
position is positively related to economic tradeoffs in all countries but the periphery. One
potential explanation for this pattern is that core nations have experienced the negative
environmental consequences of economic development. Specifically, after WWII, many
of the people in countries that are considered to be members of the core saw a rapid
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industrialization of their country. Such rapid industrialization came at great costs to the
environment. In the 1970s, when environmental consciousness shifted towards
sustainability, the costs of economic development became more apparent. This reflects
quite clearly the “socialization” hypothesis of the post-materialist perspective. That is,
historical changes in the social interaction of a population can remain relatively
unchanged even several decades later.
A second explanation of the effect of why peripheral nations appear to favor
economic development over environmental protection is that poor nations are attempting
to play “catch up” to wealthy nations (Bartley and Bergesen 1997). Though the results
here only pointed to the periphery, past research has generally pointed to the semiperiphery as the level of the core-periphery hierarchy that attempts to play catch up most
dramatically. Additional evidence to support this explanation points to the composition of
the economy, indicating that the proportion of the economy comprised of the service,
agricultural, and industrial sectors may be important. While a larger proportion of the
economy should be agricultural in the periphery, a larger portion of industrial in the semiperiphery, and a larger portion service in the core, these results are not always consistent.

Multilevel Model
In the third analysis, a multilevel model allows one to assess individual and
national level effects on environmental concern simultaneously. Of the ten hypotheses
proposed in Chapter 5, six exhibited support or partial support. The results indicate that
political conservatism, confidence in social and governmental institutions, subjective
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social class, access to outside information, gender, world-system position, and education
are significant predictors of environmental attitudes. Furthermore, age, religion, and
rural/urban residence have little or no consistent effect on environmental attitudes. This
may be due to significant variations between countries on these variables.
Overall, individual-level characteristics account for about 97% of the variance in
willingness to sacrifice, while national-level characteristics account for about 3%. These
differences appear to apply at all three levels of the core-periphery hierarchy, though
some cross-level interactions were significant. Differences between the results in each of
the two models tested suggest that there may be an important difference in findings
depending on exactly how environmental attitudes are conceptualized.
I asked three research questions that could only be assessed with a multilevel
model. First, I asked whether individual- or national- level characteristics better explain
aggregate levels of environmental concern? The short answer is that individual
characteristics potentially explain more of the variance in environmental attitudes. The
long answer is much more complicated. Though a larger proportion of the variation in
environmental attitudes is accounted for at the individual level, only about 7% of this
potential 97% of the variance is actually explained by the level-1 variables. About 3% of
the variance in environmental attitudes is accounted for at the national level. Of this three
percent, about 65% is explained by the final model. In order to better understand
environmental attitudes, it is necessary to account for variation at both levels. As the
results have shown, accounting for one level (individual, or national) provides a much
different and less-accurate picture of what is really happening.
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Next, I asked do these differences apply across all levels of the core-periphery
hierarchy? It appears that yes, these differences do apply at all three levels of the coreperiphery hierarchy. It is important to note, however, that there were several
characteristics which varied in their effect between countries. For example, religion and
educational levels have significantly different effects in some instances. Put differently,
the effect of world-system position appears to have strong effects on certain
characteristics, while having no effect on others. World-system position has no
significant effect on its own. From a purely theoretical standpoint, this may have the
implication of an overly simplistic conceptualization of world-system position. From a
practical standpoint, however, many of these differences still illustrated the expected
relationships between variables (Bartley and Bergesen 1997). Overall, however, some of
the limitations (discussed below) of this study may be the real cause of this finding.
Finally, I asked if there are differences between individuals in different nations in
terms of environmental attitudes, on which characteristics do they vary? In short,
religion, gender, and education exhibit the most consistent differences between countries
in their respective impacts on environmental attitudes. While certain religious groups
exhibit differences between levels of the core-periphery hierarchy and between countries,
others were no different. Specifically, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists exhibit the largest
differences between levels of the core-periphery hierarchy. It is reasonable to conclude
from this that the effect of religion varies because of the conceptualization of a certain set
of religious beliefs and doctrine. That is, if wealthy Americans become Buddhists, why
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should they be similar to poor Chinese Buddhists? This is unlikely and potentially
explains most of these cross-level interactions.
The effect of education appears to have considerable variation between core and
non-core countries as well. While this may be due to variation in the average level of
education within a country, it may also be due to the impact that education has on an
individual’s opportunities within a country. For example, in a core nation, a relatively
high proportion of the population is likely to have a college degree, whereas in the
periphery this proportion is much smaller. In the core, many opportunities require a
college degree as a qualification, where in peripheral nations, the proportion of jobs
requiring a college education is much smaller.
Gender is also a particularly interesting facet of this finding. Why do women in
peripheral and semi-peripheral countries have lower environmental attitudes? The results
are unclear in how best to interpret this finding. One explanation is that women have
fewer opportunities than men to get an education, or to earn a higher income, which may
explain why they generally have lower levels of environmental concern. This effect
should be more pronounced in non-core countries. Another possible explanation must
draw on the notion that women are simply more concerned with the risks associated with
environmental degradation, rather than with having a higher willingness to sacrifice or
sense of economic trade-offs (McCright 2010; Blocker and Eckberg 1997). That is,
women are more concerned about how the actual degradation may impact their families,
and not so much with actually preserving the environment for the environments sake. If
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this is the case, additional analyses with other measures to assess environmental attitudes
are necessary.
Another question to ask about this finding is about what it means to be a woman
in the core versus the periphery. If women in the core are given basically the same rights
as men, we should see fewer differences among women in the core. Similarly, if women
in the periphery are given fewer rights than men, this difference should be highlighted.
Put differently, where the roles of men and women come closer to convergence
(relatively speaking), fewer differences should exist.
Model 1: Willingness to Sacrifice. In the first model, I assessed environmental
attitudes via a scale of two items designed to assess the willingness to sacrifice for
environmental protection. Many of the findings mirrored those from both the individuallevel and national-level analyses discussed above (and in Chapters 3 and 4). Overall, The
results indicate that political conservatism, confidence in social and governmental
institutions, subjective social class, access to outside information, gender, world-system
position, and education are significant predictors of environmental attitudes.
Model 2: Economic Tradeoffs. In the second model, I assessed environmental
attitudes via a dichotomous variable designed to assess the economic tradeoffs inherent in
many of the environmental protection debates. Again, many of the findings were similar
to those from both the individual and national-level analyses discussed above. The
differences between Model 1 and Model 2 highlight the importance of how exactly
environmental attitudes are conceptualized. For more discussion on this issue, see the
limitations section below.
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
In the preceding chapters, I have relied upon two theoretical frameworks in order
to develop and interpret the results in the previous analyses. The post-materialist thesis is
useful in the development of the individual-level and level-1 of the multilevel model
analyses. In brief, the post-materialist thesis posits that those with higher social class,
exhibit more concern for post-material values like environmental protection, particularly
when those people have been a part of a generation that experienced difficulty meeting its
material needs.
Based on this theoretical assumption, the post-material thesis is a useful
framework for assessing the individual-level characteristics of people that influence their
environmental attitudes. Another perspective, the NEP assumes that due to a paradigm
shift, people have become more environmentally aware, and eventually this awareness
has become environmental concern. In other words, because people have accepted their
responsibility for much environmental degradation, and because they have had time to
witness such effects, people have subsequently become more concerned about the
condition of the environment, and the severity of its degradation. But this begs the
question: what are the characteristics of those who are the most concerned? Past research
has suggested many characteristics like social class, political orientation, and even race,
religion and whether one lives in a rural or urban setting.
The results of the previous analyses indicate that political ideology, confidence in
social and governmental institutions, subjective social class, gender, and education are
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the most important individual-level predictors of environmental attitudes. Unfortunately,
neither the post-materialist thesis or the NEP is as useful for assessing national-level
characteristics of environmental attitudes. In order to understand differences between
countries, rather than differences within countries, I turn to the world-system perspective.
Proponents of the world-system perspective argue that the interaction between nations is
bounded by a single economic (capitalist) system, rather than a multitude of distinct and
independent nation-states. As such, nations are placed in a hierarchy of world-system
position, which contains three main categories: the core, the semi-periphery, and the
periphery. Core nations, like the U.S. and Western Europe, are the wealthiest nations,
which generally benefit the most from the world-system. Peripheral nations, like those in
sub-Saharan Africa, generally benefit the least, and experience persistent exploitation
from Core nations. The Semi-Periphery is the nations that fall somewhere in-between the
core and periphery, like Mexico and the former Soviet Republics. These nations benefit
marginally from the world-system by exploiting peripheral nations, but are also exploited
by core nations. Additionally, the middle position generally encourages economic
development in an effort to catch-up to nations in the core.
As a macro-theoretical perspective, the world-system approach allows one to
clearly and easily compare nations to one another based on the metric of the coreperiphery hierarchy. The findings of the preceding analyses indicate that national-level
characteristics like world-system position and access to outside information are important
predictors of the environmental attitudes of the residents of various nations. Access to
outside sources of information appear to have a negative association with environmental
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attitudes, suggesting that the process might not operate as one might expect. The
influence of world-system position on environmental attitudes is not absolutely clear, as
it appears to have its biggest effects via its interaction with other variables like gender
and religious affiliation.
Overall, however the findings presented here contribute significantly to the
literature on environmental attitudes in three ways. First, I applied two theoretical
approaches, the world-systems perspective, and the New Ecological Paradigm to a crossnational and international sample of respondents. Second, I highlight the importance of
assessing both individual and national-level characteristics when examining
environmental attitudes cross-nationally. Third, I highlight the importance of measuring
environmental attitudes by using two different measures of environmental attitudes,
willingness to sacrifice, and economic tradeoffs in order to illustrate how the means of
assessing environmental attitudes can impact the results.
In previous research, the world-systems perspective has not been used to assess
environmental attitudes. It has, however, been used to assess environmental degradation.
This new application of the world-systems perspective provides an important link
between two substantive areas of environmental research: environmental degradation,
and environmental attitudes. Also, using the world-systems perspective brings an
alternative perspective to the environmental sociological literature which has generally
ignored it.
The New Ecological Paradigm has generally been used in studies conducted with
samples from a single nation, or a small subset of peer nations (the U.S. and Canada for
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example). Unfortunately this hides differences between nations, making it easier to
assume that there are no differences. By overcoming this problem, this study highlights
what should have been obvious; the correlates of environmental attitudes are very
different between nations. Additionally, when examining the predictors of environmental
attitudes, one must examine each sample differently, as cross-national variation can affect
findings significantly.
Post-materialism is the perspective which has generally found the most support in
the findings. Specifically, it appears that social class is related to environmental attitudes
in both individual-level and multilevel models. Though I do not examine the values of the
populations of the nations in the data, this consistency is important nonetheless in that it
allowed for a useful means of incorporating individual-level and national-level theories in
an effort to better explain environmental attitudes.
Next, I found that examining individual-level characteristics does explain a larger
portion of variance than do national-level characteristics, making it a necessity when
conducting international or cross-national research. National-level characteristics,
however, remain an important set of factors to account for, particularly when one is
attempting to find all potential predictors of a particular outcome. In other words, though
it is important to account for individual-level characteristics, national-level characteristics
can be especially fruitful in international or cross-national research. My findings in the
multilevel analysis (Chapter 5) were much more interesting than my findings in the
individual-level analysis (Chapter 3) because of this.
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Finally, as others have noted (Franzen 2003), how exactly one measures
environmental attitudes can have an inescapable impact on their findings. In order to
overcome this obstacle, particularly with secondary data (see limitations below), I used
two measures of environmental attitudes. The first measure, “willingness to sacrifice”
was created from a scale of two items and assesses to what extent people are willing to
make personal economic sacrifices in order to protect the environment. The second
measure, “economic tradeoffs” was created using a dichotomous measure to assess
whether or not people would rather protect the environment or promote economic
growth. Though similar, the findings point to some important differences between the
two measures of environmental attitudes. First, they do not produce the same results,
which suggest that people assess their relationship with the environment differently,
when they see it from their own personal perspective, or from the society to which they
belongs perspective. Second, using two measures of environmental attitudes improves
reliability, by highlighting the observed but unintended differences between how one
expects the relationship between two variables to be, and how it actually is.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
As with all research, there were several limitations to this study: the concept of
environmental attitudes was assessed in a different way than in other studies; and the
small sample of countries used in the national-level analysis (Chapter 4) and the
multilevel analysis (Chapter 5) impacts statistical power.
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By using different measures of environmental attitudes, I have limited the
comparability of these findings to the findings of others. In many cases, this is not
problematic, but I believe that it may be here, especially as I see environmental attitudes
to be a global idea, rather than a national one. Often times, however, this is simply a sideeffect of using secondary data.
The relatively small sample size of countries (N = 27) limited the availability of
degrees of freedom in the multilevel analysis and the national-level analysis. This limits
the reliability of the estimates presented. In the national-level analysis this prevented
almost anything from obtaining statistical significance, while in the multilevel analysis I
used p > .1 as the critical value to assess statistical significance, and still found few
statistically significant level-2 (country-level) associations. Unfortunately, even a dataset
containing all nations may not have the statistical power required to test some of these
hypotheses using multilevel models. With this important caveat established, the other
limitation has to do with the range of variation on some of these characteristics.
Government type was not significantly associated with environmental attitudes, but it was
a skewed measure, as there were 17 “republics” and two “communist states,” a few
“monarchies,” and a handful of “other” types of governments.

Directions for Future Research
Beyond these two main issues, the study points to several important directions for
future research. First, the role of confidence in institutions, I have rarely come across
research focusing on this idea specifically for environmental attitudes. Future research
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should examine specific institutions and their association with environmental attitudes.
Second, the religion effect on environmental attitudes appears to be specific, yet unclear.
Future research should examine this relationship more closely, and using a variety of
means to clarify how this relationship operates. Lastly, the concept of environmental
attitudes continues to need refinement. While some scales have remained popular, most
of them are complicated and have a large number of survey questions in order to measure
them. While this is useful for constructing a scale, it is costly and prohibitive to those
collecting such data. Future research should continue to examine how to best measure the
concept of environmental attitudes. Additionally, future research should be conducted on
national level characteristics using other measures of environmental attitudes. Such
analyses could inform the literature by attempting to standardize the measurement of
environmental attitudes, and also by clarifying exactly which countries belong at which
level of the core-periphery hierarchy.
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Figure 2.1 Kondratieff Wave Cycle
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Figure 2.2: The Basic Iteration Model of World-System Development Adapted from
Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997.
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Table 3.1 Country List and Proportions of Sample
Frequency
Percent
Country
Albania

1000

2.8

Argentina

1280

3.6

Bangladesh

1500

4.3

Bosnia

1200

3.4

Canada

1931

5.5

Chile

1200

3.4

China

1000

2.8

India

2002

5.7

Japan

1362

3.9

Kyrgyzstan

1043

3.0

Macedonia

1055

3.0

Mexico

1535

4.4

Moldova

1008

2.9

Montenegro

1060

3.0

Peru

1501

4.3

Philippines

1200

3.4

Puerto Rico

720

2.1

Serbia

1200

3.4

Singapore

1512

4.3

South Africa

3000

8.5

South Korea

1200

3.4

Spain

1209

3.4

Tanzania

1171

3.3

Uganda

1002

2.9

United States of Am erica

1200

3.4

Vietnam

1000

2.8

Zimbabwe
Total

1002

2.9

35093

100.0
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Figure 3.1: Subjective Social Class Distribution
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Education
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Figure 3.3: Frequencies of Religious Traditions
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Table 3.2: Bivariate Correlations for Individual Characteristics

1
1
1
.00

1

.02

-.02

1
-.05

1
1

14

1
.09
.14
.00

-.06
.02

13

1

.03

.00

-.01

12

1

.40
.01
.33
.03
.03

1

11

1

.02

-.03

-.09

.00

1

10

.22

.11
-.18
.03
-.04
.08

-.05

-.05

9

.12

.04

-.06
.00

-.05

.01

-.02

-.10

8

.16
.03

.03
.04

-.07

7

.06

.06
-.02
.02

.03

6

-.01

-.01
.15

.05

5

Willingness to
1 Sacrifice Scale

.09
-.01
.03

.03

4

2 Economic Tradeoffs
Confidence in
Government
3 Institutions
Confidence in the
Environmental
4 Movement

-.03
.01

.01

3

5 Income
6 Urban

-.03
-.05
.06

-.01

2

Subjective Social
7 Class

.07

.02

-.06

1

8 Age
9 Sex
-.08
.00

10 Conservative
11 Protestant
.00

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1

-.01

1

1

-.01

1
-.02

1

.03

-.03

-.29

.02

-.15

-.17

.09

-.02

-.21

.03

-.09

-.03

.00

-.01

-.04

-.01

-.07

-.20

.02

-.02

-.26

-.02

-.09

-.11

12 Other Religion
13 Buddhist

-.03

-.15

1

-.13

-.09

-.10
-.01

-.12

-.05

-.07

-.12

-.08
.00

-.15

-.06

.01

-.18

1

1

1

1

-.11
.01

-.23

.03

-.25

-.33

-.19

-.10

-.09

.09

.00

-.02

-.03

.01

-.41

-.12

-.29

-.16
.03

.04

-.05

.01

-.04

-.04

-.15

-.18

.00

-.01

.03

-.03

-.02

-.09

.07

.05

-.22

.08

.03

.01

.04

-.01

.08

.00

.00

-.03

-.08

-.01

-.01

.02

-.01

-.02

.02

-.03

.01

.01

-.02

-.01

-.04

.02

.04

-.02

.01

.18

.03

-.04

-.09

-.04

.03

-.09

.00

.10

-.05

.04

.05

.02

-.02

.03

-.14

.00

.03

.09

-.05

-.02

-.01

.03

.00

.04

.05

.03

.02

-.01

.00

-.11

-.11

.04

.21

-.01

-.05

-.01

-.02

-.17

.00

.02

-.23

-.09

-.02

.00

-.03

-.09

-.02

-.11

-.09

-.04

-.11

-.02

-.01

-.07

.01

.04

-.18

.03

.07

-.08

-.04

.00

.03

.05
-.03

-.04

.02

.09

-.03

-.04

.04

.09

.04

.07

.04

.25

.05

-.01
-.07
.04

-.01

.06

.11

.08

-.06
-.04

-.08

.01

.21

.01

-.04

.01

-.03

.02

-.05

.03

.05

-.07

.03

.04

.09

-.03

.08

14 Hindu
15 Muslim
16 Jew
17 Orthodox
No Religious
18 Preference
19 Catholic
Some Primary
20 Education
Some Secondary
21 Education
Completed
Secondary
22 Education
Some College
23 Education
Completed College
24 Education
Correlations significant at the .05 level or higher in bold

24

1
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Table 3.3: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION
RESULTS OF THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
CHARACTERISTICS ON WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE
Variable
Constant
Confidence in Government Institutions
Conf. in the Environmental Movement
Some Primary Education
Some Secondary Education
Completed Secondary Education
Some College Education
Completed College Education
Income
Social Class
Urban
Age
Sex
Conservative
Protestant
Other Religion
Buddhist
Hindu
Muslim
Jew
Orthodox
Catholic

Coefficient
3.909
0.158
0.231
0.170
0.207
0.359
0.495
0.551
0.004
0.090
-0.007
-0.001
-0.068
0.032
-0.425
-0.232
-0.010
-0.268
-0.008
-0.048
0.133
-0.118

*** p < .001
**p < .01
* p < .05
Religion Reference = "no religious preference"
Education Reference = "no formal education"
N = 34,555

Standard
Error
0.065
0.013
0.010
0.041
0.043
0.042
0.050
0.046
0.004
0.009
0.017
0.001
0.016
0.003
0.029
0.037
0.045
0.040
0.028
0.114
0.030
0.024

Significance
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
***

***
***
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Table 3.4: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE EFFECTS
OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS ON ECONOMIC
TRADEOFFS

Confidence in Government Institutions
Conf. in the Environmental Movement
Some Primary Education
Some Secondary Education
Completed Secondary Education
Some College Education
Completed College Education
Income
Social Class
Urban
Age
Sex
Conservative
Protestant
Other Religion
Buddhist
Hindu
Muslim
Jew
Orthodox
Catholic
*** p < .001
**p < .01
* p < .05
Religion Reference = "no religious preference"
Education Reference = "no formal education"
N = 34,555

Odds
Ratio

Standard
Error

0.988
1.287
1.028
1.084
1.299
1.808
1.962
0.995
1.061
1.006
1.002
0.965
1.011
0.682
0.836
0.856
0.964
0.712
0.724
0.798
1.021

0.017
0.018
0.059
0.065
0.075
0.129
0.127
0.005
0.013
0.024
0.001
0.021
0.004
0.028
0.043
0.054
0.054
0.028
0.115
0.034
0.035

Significance

***

***
***
***
***
**
**
***
**
**
***
*
***
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Table 3.5 R-Squared by Country
Country

Adjusted
R-Squared
0.1109
0.0508
0.0557
0.0905
0.0866
0.0209
0.0553
0.1524
0.0760
0.0744
0.0299
0.0512
0.0470
0.1193
0.0097
0.0384
-0.0007
*
0.1092
0.0711
0.0468
0.0321
0.0748
0.0326
0.0641

Albania
Argentina
Bangladesh
Bosnia
Canada
Chile
China
India
Japan
Kyrgyzstan
Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Montenegro
Peru
Philippines
Puerto Rico
Serbia
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Tanzania
Uganda
United States of
America
0.0894
Vietnam
0.1531
Zimbabwe
0.0919
Average
0.0679
*None of the predictors were
significant
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Table 4.1: Nations by Core, Semi-Peripheral, or Peripheral Status, ESI
Scores and World System Position Scores
ESI Score World System Position Score
Core Nations
Argentina
62.49
-0.26
Canada
78.14
1.42
Chile
56.58
-0.12
China
37.56
1.46
Japan
60.56
3.22
Mexico
45.28
-0.17
Singapore
46.80
1.54
South Korea
40.30
0.34
Spain
59.51
0.72
United States
66.10
11.93
Semi-Peripheral Nations
India
40.87
-0.31
Macedonia
39.21
-1.19
Peru
54.32
-1.04
Philippines
35.68
-1.05
Puerto Rico
*
-0.52
South Africa
*
-1.38
Vietnam
34.19
-1.32
Zimbabwe
52.01
-1.33
Peripheral Nations
Albania
44.17
-1.42
Bangladesh
39.45
-1.34
Bosnia
*
-1.40
Kyrgyzstan
39.63
-1.35
Moldova
47.44
-1.36
Montenegro
*
-1.38
Serbia
*
-1.38
Tanzania
40.33
-1.53
Uganda
44.03
-1.48
*ESI Score not available
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Figure 4.1: Linear Relationship Between Willingness to Sacrifice Scale and Logged13
World-System Position Score

13

The World-System Position variable was transformed by using the log of the original score plus two as
the data included negative values.
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Figure 4.2: Linear Relationship Between Economic Tradeoffs and Logged14 WorldSystem Position Score

14

The World-System Position variable was transformed by using the log of the original score plus two as
the data included negative values.
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Figure 4.3: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Cellular Telephones Per-Capita by
Willingness to Sacrifice Scale
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Figure 4.4: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Internet Users Per-Capita by Willingness to
Sacrifice Scale
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Figure 4.5: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Land Line Telephones Per-Capita by
Willingness to Sacrifice Scale
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Figure 4.6: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Televisions Per-Capita by Willingness to
Sacrifice Scale
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Figure 4.7: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Cellular Telephones Per-Capita by
Economic Tradeoffs
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Figure 4.8: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Internet Users Per-Capita by Economic
Tradeoffs
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Figure 4.9: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Land Line Telephones Per-Capita by
Economic Tradeoffs
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Figure 4.10: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Televisions Per-Capita by Economic
Tradeoffs
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Figure 4.11: Scatterplot of Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) Score by
Willingness to Sacrifice Scale
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Figure 4.12: Scatterplot of Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) Score by Economic
Tradeoffs
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Table 5.1: Six Multilevel Models Examining the Impacts of Individual-Level and National-Level Characteristics on Willingness to Sacrifice
Model 1:
Model 2: No
Model 3: No
Model 4: Main
Model 5: Full
World-System
Interactions and No
Social Class
Effects Model
Model with No
Position Effects
Social Class
Measures with
With No
Interactions
Measures
Interactions
Interactions or
Variance
Components
Variable
Level-1
Constant
Confidence in
Government Institutions
Confidence in the
Environmental
Movement
Some Primary Education
Some Secondary
Education
Completed Secondary
Education
Some College Education
Completed College
Education
Income
Subjective Social Class
Urban
Age
Women
Conservative

Coef.

S.E.

5.53

.08

***

Coef.

S.E.

Coef.

S.E.

Coef.

S.E.

11.9
.08

1.38
.03

.25

.02

---

***
**

12.22
.08

1.38
.02

***
**

9.74
.1

2.32
.01

***

.25

.02

***

.24

---

---

---

--

--

--

---

---

--.08
.
-.1
.01

--.04
.
.03
.01

+
***
**

Coef.

S.E.

**
***

11.27
.09

1.33
.03

.01

***

.24

.12
.28

.04
.04

**
***

--

.33

.04

---

---

.35
.46

.05
.05

--.08
.
-.11
.01

--.04
.
.02
.01

.
.1
.06
.
-.07
.01

.
.01
.02
.
.02
.

+
***
***

Model 6: Full
Model with
Interactions

Coef.

S.E.

***
**

11.9
.09

1.36
.03

***
**

.02

***

.24

.02

***

.13
.26

.07
.08

+
**

.12
.25

.06
.07

+
**

***

.32

.07

***

.31

.06

***

***
***

.36
.46

.08
.08

***
***

.35
.44

.07
.07

***
***

***
**
***
***
***

.01
.11
.03
.
-.08
.01

.01
.02
.04
.
.03
.01

.01
.11
.03
.
-.08
.01

.01
.02
.04
.
.02
.01

***

**

***

**
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Protestant
Other Religion
Buddhist
Hindu
Muslim
Jewish
Orthodox
Catholic
Level-2
Semiperipheral World
System Position
Peripheral World System
Position
Environmental
Sustainability Index
(ESI) Score
Percent GDP Agriculture
Percent GDP Industry
Percent GDP Services
Proportion with Landline
Telephone
Monarchist Government
Communist Government
Other Government
Proportion Women (L1)
Average Subjective
Social Class (L1)

.02
-.18
-.02
-.12
.03
.04
-.05
.04

.04
.07
.07
.08
.11
.15
.12
.05

*

.05
-.13
.31
-.08
.16
.03
-.09
.04

.05
.08
.17
.12
.13
.16
.14
.05

+

+

-.07
-.13
.09
-.12
-.12
-.14
-.13
-.06

.03
.04
.05
.05
.04
.11
.05
.03

-.31

*
**
*
*
**
*
**
*

.01
-.11
.02
-.08
.08
-.01
.04
.05

.04
.07
.07
.08
.11
.14
.11
.05

.22

-.43

.11

.04
-.09
.33
-.02
.2
.02
-.01
.05

.06
.09
.16
.1
.11
.14
.13
.05

**

-.36

.15

+

.19

.15

+
+

.18

.18

-.37

.11

*

-.31

.15

.21

.18

.34

.12

*

.23

.16

.

.24

.28

.12

.01

.

.01

.

.

.01

.01

.

.01

.

-.01
.

.01
.01

-.01
-.01

.01
.01

+

-.01
-.01

.01
.01

-.01
.

.01
.01

-.01
.

.01
.01

+

.02
-.05

.
.01

**
**

.02
-.06

.
.01

**
**

.02
-.07

.01
.03

+
*

.02
-.05

.
.01

**
**

.02
-.06

.
.01

**
**

-.78
.8
.45
-5.3
-1.56

.19
.18
.09
1.39
.32

**
**
**
*
**

-.82
.78
.42
-5.82
-1.73

.19
.18
.09
1.41
.32

**
**
**
**
***

-1.08
.8
.33
-4.1
-1.39

.35
.31
.18
2.37
.54

*
*

-.73
.79
.44
-5.8
-1.55

.19
.17
.09
1.38
.31

*
**
**
**
**

-.77
.82
.43
-6.26
-1.73

.19
.18
.09
1.41
.31

**
**
**
**
***

*

+
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Average Confidence in
Gov't Institutions (L1)

.75

.15

**

.79

.14

***

.5

.29

.76

.14

**

.84

.14

***

Average Confidence in
Environmental
Movement (L1)
Proportion Some
Primary Education (L1)

-.94

.22

**

-.91

.23

**

-.33

.41

-.94

.22

**

-.99

.22

**

2.86

.57

**

2.99

.55

***

3.51

1.16

3.6

.55

***

3.67

.56

***

Proportion Some
Secondary Education
(L1)

.89

.68

1.02

.68

1.14

1.28

1.96

.67

*

2.03

.68

*

Proportion Completed
Secondary Education
(L1)
Proportion Some College
Education (L1)
Proportion Completed
College Education (L1)

1.18

.44

*

1.37

.44

*

1.86

.95

1.96

.44

**

2.06

.45

**

-3.

1.37

+

-3.09

1.37

+

-3.74

2.41

-1.43

1.33

-1.78

1.37

8.95

1.41

***

9.65

1.42

***

9.81

2.44

**

9.61

1.36

***

10.27

1.4

***

Average Income (L1)

-.25

.06

***

-.26

.05

***

-.35

.1

*

-.26

.05

**

-.28

.05

**

-.15

.12

-.16

.12

.04
.21

.14
.36

.09
.12

.13
.34

.37

.33

.31

.3

-.1

.4

-.11

.37

-.16
-.64

.36
.32

-.04
-.63

.32
.28

Cross-Level
Interactions
Catholic by
Semiperiphery
Catholic by Periphery
Orthodox by
Semiperiphery
Orthodox by Periphery
Jewish by Semiperiphery
Jewish by Periphery
Muslim by

+

*

+

*
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Semiperiphery
Muslim by Periphery
Hindu by Semiperiphery
Hindu by Periphery
Buddhist by
Semiperiphery

-.51
-.39
-.16
.18

.31
.18
.33
.15

Buddhist by Periphery
Other Religion by
Semiperiphery
Other Religion by
Periphery
Protestant by
Semiperiphery
Protestant by Periphery
Conservative by
Semiperiphery
Conservative by
Periphery
Women by
Semiperiphery
Women by Periphery
Age by Semiperiphery
Age by Periphery
Urban by Semiperiphery
Urban by Periphery

.84
-.15

Confidence in
Government Institutions
by Semiperiphery

-.44
-.39
-.1
.21

.27
.19
.28
.14

.5
.15

.85
-.19

.48
.16

.02

.23

.05

.23

-.11

.1

-.11

.11

.13
.

.15
.02

.14
.

.15
.02

.01

.02

.

.02

-.11

.06

+

-.11

.06

+

-.18
.
.
-.01
.07
.01

.06
.
.
.11
.11
.06

**

-.16
.
.
-.04
.05
.03

.06
.
.
.09
.09
.06

**

*

*

+
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Confidence in
Government Institutions
by Periphery
Confidence in
Environmental
Movement by
Semiperiphery

-.13

.06

-.04

Confidence in
Environmental
Movement by Periphery
Subjective Social Class
by Semiperiphery
Subjective Social Class
by Periphery
Some Primary Education
by Semiperiphery

.06

-.1

.06

.05

-.04

.05

.05

.04

.05

-.02

.04

.02

.04

-.17

.13

-.42

.15

-.16

.15

-.41

.16

Completed Secondary
Education by
Semiperiphery

-.09

.15

Completed Secondary
Education by Periphery

-.26

.16

Some College Education
by Semiperiphery
Some College Education
by Periphery

-.19

.16

-.33

.18

Some Primary Education
by Periphery
Some Secondary
Education by
Semiperiphery
Some Secondary
Education by Periphery

*

**

*

+
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Completed College
Education by
Semiperiphery
Completed College
Education by Periphery
Income by
Semiperiphery
Income by Periphery
Variance Components
Between Nation
Variance
Catholic
Orthodox
Jewish
Muslim
Hindu
Buddhist
Other
Protestant
Conservative
Women
Age
Subjective Social Class
Urban
Confidence in Gov't
Institutions

VC

SD

.16

.4

***

VC

SD

VC

SD

VC

SD

.07

.26

.06

.24

.04

.19

.04

.19

***

.04

.2

.22

.47

*

.23

.17

.41

**

.26
.04
.03
.07
.01
.
.01
.
-.04
.01

.5
.2
.17
.27
.11
.03
.12
.
-.2
.12

*

**
***
*
***
***
***

-.13

.16

-.27

.17

-.01

.01

.

.01

VC

SD

VC

SD

.06

.25

.06

.24

***

.03

.19

***

.04

.2

***

.48

*

.17

.41

*

.18

.42

*

.17

.41

**

.1

.32

.11

.33

**

.27
.05
.03
.06
.02
.03
.09
.
-.2
.11

.52
.22
.16
.25
.14
.
.01
.
-.04
.01

*

.23
.05
.03
.09
.01
.
.01
.
.
.03
.02

.48
.22
.17
.29
.12
.03
.11
.
.07
.16
.12

.2
.05
.02
.08
.02
.
.01
.
.
.02
.01

.45
.23
.14
.28
.15
.03
.09
.
.07
.16
.11

*
+
+
***
***
+
***
***
***
***
**

**
+
***
+
***
***
***

***

*

**
***
*
**
***
***
***
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Confidence in the
Environmental
Movement
Some Primary Education
Some Secondary
Education
Completed Secondary
Education
Some College Education
Completed College
Education
Income
Within Nation Variance
Deviance
Number of Estimated
Parameters
Change in Deviance
Change in Degrees of
Freedom
Level-1 Variance
Explained
Level-2 Variance
Explained
Overall Variance
Explained
*** p < .001
**p < .01

2.1

1.45

123796.35
3

.01

.1

---

.09

.01

.01

.09

*

.01

.09

*

---

---

---

.08
.09

.28
.31

*
+

.03
.04

.16
.21

*
*

--

--

--

--

.07

.26

*

.04

.19

*

---

---

---

---

.09
.09

.29
.3

+
*

.04
.05

.21
.22

*
+

--

--

--

--

.

.02

.

.02

*

1.98

1.41

1.98

1.41

1.95

1.39

1.94

1.39

122058.56
156

+

122019.84
184

--

1737.79

38.72

--

22

.00

**

2.

1.41

122044.73
44

121451.2
296

121405.77
338

593.53

45.43

2

24.89
4

1

2

.06

.06

.05

.07

.07

.06

.58

.64

.77

.62

.65

.00

.09

.10

.10

.11

.11
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* p < .05
+ p < 0.1
Religion Reference = "no religious preference"
Education Reference = "no formal education"
Level-1 N = 34,555
Level-2 N = 27
Data Sources: Level-1 data come from the 1999-2001 World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). Level-2 data come from the 2000 Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) and from the 2000 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)
(http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/).
Additional analyses indicate that social class variables explain about 1.6% of the variance at level-1.
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Table 5.2: Four Multilevel Models Examining the Impacts of Individual-Level and National-Level Characteristics on Economic Tradeoffs
Model 1: Main Effects Model
Model 2: Main Effects Model
Model 3: Full Model without
without Interactions
without Social Class
Social Class Measures
Measures
Variables
Level-1
Constant
Confidence in
Government Institutions
Confidence in the
Environmental Movement
Some Primary Education
Some Secondary
Education
Completed Secondary
Education
Some College Education
Completed College
Education
Income
Subjective Social Class
Urban
Age
Women
Conservative
Protestant

Coef.

S.E.

Odds
Ratio

Coef.

S.E.

Odds
Ratio

Coef.

S.E.

Odds
Ratio

.73

1.25

2.08

2.98

1.43

19.66

+

2.83

1.41

16.99

-.05

.03

.95

-.07

.02

**

-.06

.03
.01

.03
.07

1.3
1.01

.27
--

.01
--

***

.12

.08

1.13

--

.25
.37

.08
.1

1.28
1.45

**
**

.51
.01
.03
.01
.
-.07
-.01
.03

.1
.01
.02
.05
.
.03
.01
.06

1.66
1.01
1.03
1.01
1.
.93
.99
1.03

***

***

*
*

Model 4: Full Model

Coef.

S.E.

Odds
Ratio

+

1.75

1.34

5.74

.02

**

-.04

.02

.96

*

.01
--

***
--

.26
-.06

.01
.07

1.29
.94

***

--

.27
--

--

--

--

--

--

.03

.07

1.03

---

---

---

---

---

---

.16
.29

.07
.08

1.18
1.33

*
**

---.09
.
-.09
-.01
.01

---.05
.
.03
.01
.05

---1.09
1.
.91
.99
1.01

---.1
.
-.09
-.01
.03

---.05
.
.03
.01
.06

---1.11
1.
.91
.99
1.03

.45
.01
.04
.02
.
-.06
-.01
.03

.07
.01
.02
.04
.
.03
.01
.06

1.57
1.01
1.04
1.02
1.
.94
.99
1.03

***

+
*
**
+

*
*
**

*

+
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Other Religion
Buddhist

-.01
.13

.09
.1

.99
1.14

Hindu
Muslim

-.34
-.13

.21
.1

.71
.87

Jewish
Orthodox

-.38
-.04

.19
.1

.68
.96

Catholic

.02

.06

1.02

Level-2
Semiperipheral World
System Position
Peripheral World System
Position

-.45

.11

.64

-.6

.13

.55

.01
.02
.01
.02

.
.01
.01
.

1.01
1.02
1.01
1.02

-.07
-.38
.38
-.12
2.56

.01
.18
.17
.09
1.35

.93
.69
1.46
.89
12.96

-.73

.29

.48

.14

.15

1.15

Environmental
Sustainability Index (ESI)
Score
Percent GDP Agriculture
Percent GDP Industry
Percent GDP Services
Proportion with Landline
Telephone
Monarchist Government
Communist Government
Other Government
Proportion Women (L1)
Average Subjective Social
Class (L1)
Average Confidence in
Gov't Institutions (L1)

*

-.05
-.08

.08
.07

.95
.93

.07
.37

.11
.25

1.07
1.45

.12
.3

.12
.25

1.13
1.36

-.14
-.18

.14
.08

.87
.83

-.09
-.25

.17
.11

.92
.78

-.15
-.29

.17
.1

.86
.75

-.42
-.1

.16
.07

.66
.9

-.32
-.01

.18
.13

.72
.99

-.41
.01

.18
.13

.67
1.01

-.01

.04

.99

.03

.05

1.03

.03

.05

1.03

**

-.45

.12

.64

-.46

.14

.63

*

-.46

.14

.63

*

**

-.17

.14

.85

-.31

.16

.73

+

-.4

.15

.67

*

.01
.
.
.01

.
.01
.01
.

1.02
1.
1.
1.01

*

.01
.
-.01
.01

.
.01
.01
.

1.01
1.
.99
1.01

*

.01
.01
.
.01

.
.01
.01
.

1.01
1.01
1.
1.01

***
+
+

-.07
-.45
.83
-.14
-1.59

.01
.21
.19
.1
1.51

.94
.64
2.28
.87
.2

**
+
**

-.07
-.44
.77
-.12
-.9

.01
.21
.18
.11
1.5

.93
.64
2.16
.89
.41

**
+
**

-.05
-.26
.68
-.11
.66

.01
.2
.18
.1
1.44

.95
.77
1.96
.9
1.94

*

*

-.97

.34

.38

*

-.98

.33

.37

*

-.76

.31

.47

+

.17

.17

1.18

.16

.17

1.18

.16

.16

1.17

*

*
*

*
*

*

*
+

*

*
*

*
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Average Confidence in
Environmental Movement
(L1)
Proportion Some Primary
Education (L1)
Proportion Some
Secondary Education
(L1)
Proportion Completed
Secondary Education
(L1)
Proportion Some College
Education (L1)
Proportion Completed
College Education (L1)
Average Income (L1)
Cross-Level Interactions
#
Catholic by
Semiperiphery
Catholic by Periphery
Orthodox by
Semiperiphery
Orthodox by Periphery
Jewish by Semiperiphery
Jewish by Periphery
Muslim by Semiperiphery
Muslim by Periphery
Hindu by Semiperiphery

.17

.22

1.19

.26

.25

1.29

.27

.25

1.31

.2

.24

1.22

.84

.57

2.32

1.11

.63

3.03

1.11

.66

3.02

.5

.6

1.64

-1.2

.67

.3

-.6

.75

.55

-.6

.76

.55

-.92

.71

.4

.13

.46

1.14

.14

.5

1.15

.08

.52

1.09

-.3

.48

.74

-.59

1.29

.55

-.65

1.47

.52

-.89

1.48

.41

-.04

1.37

.96

3.52
-.27

1.32
.05

33.76
.76

5.36
-.31

1.48
.06

212.29
.73

5.12
-.34

1.5
.06

167.65
.71

*
***

3.36
-.25

1.4
.05

28.79
.78

+
**

.2
.17

.1
.13

1.22
1.19

*

.19
.18

.1
.13

1.21
1.2

+

-.52
-.23
.33
-.38
.38
.49
-.24

.34
.32
.48
.36
.28
.26
.41

.59
.79
1.39
.68
1.46
1.63
.79

-.58
-.27
.42
-.2
.55
.59
-.35

.34
.32
.48
.37
.27
.25
.4

.56
.76
1.52
.82
1.73
1.8
.7

+

*
**

*
***

+

+
*
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Hindu by Periphery
Buddhist by
Semiperiphery
Buddhist by Periphery
Other Religion by
Semiperiphery
Other Religion by
Periphery
Protestant by
Semiperiphery
Protestant by Periphery
Conservative by
Semiperiphery

-.05

.44

.95

-.14

.44

.87

.3
1.28

.18
.73

1.34
3.61

+

.27
.96

.18
.74

1.32
2.62

.41

.17

1.5

*

.43

.19

1.54

*

.67

.31

1.95

*

.69

.33

2.

*

.04
.

.11
.16

1.04
1.

.02
.03

.11
.16

1.02
1.03

.

.01

1.

.

.01

1.

Conservative by Periphery

.02

.01

1.02

.02

.01

1.02

Women by Semiperiphery
Women by Periphery
Age by Semiperiphery
Age by Periphery
Urban by Semiperiphery
Urban by Periphery
Confidence in
Government Institutions
by Semiperiphery

-.08
-.03
.
.
-.06
.02

.07
.07
.
.
.12
.11

.92
.97
1.
1.
.94
1.02

-.07
-.04
.
.
-.09
.04

.07
.07
.
.
.11
.1

.93
.96
1.
1.
.92
1.04

.04

.05

1.04

.08

.05

1.08

.15

.05

1.16

**

.17

.05

1.18

**

-.06

.03

.94

+

-.08

.03

.93

*

Confidence in
Government Institutions
by Periphery
Confidence in
Environmental Movement
by Semiperiphery
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Confidence in
Environmental Movement
by Periphery
Subjective Social Class by
Semiperiphery
Subjective Social Class by
Periphery
Some Primary Education
by Semiperiphery
Some Primary Education
by Periphery
Some Secondary
Education by
Semiperiphery
Some Secondary
Education by Periphery
Completed Secondary
Education by
Semiperiphery
Completed Secondary
Education by Periphery
Some College Education
by Semiperiphery
Some College Education
by Periphery
Completed College
Education by
Semiperiphery
Completed College
Education by Periphery
Income by Semiperiphery

-.01

.04

.99

-.03

.04

.97

--

--

--

-.02

.05

.98

--

--

--

.

.05

1.

--

--

--

.17

.15

1.19

--

--

--

.09

.17

1.1

--

--

--

.21

.16

1.23

--

--

--

.09

.18

1.1

--

--

--

.19

.15

1.21

--

--

--

-.11

.17

.9

--

--

--

.18

1.15

1.24

--

--

--

.21

-.89

.83

--

--

--

.17

1.09

---

---

---

.19
-.02

.48
1.62
.03

.74
.98
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Income by Periphery
Variance Components
Intercept

VC
.03

SD
.16

Catholic
Orthodox

.05
.09

.23
.3

Jewish
Muslim

.12
.15

.34
.39

Hindu
Buddhist

.45
.08

.67
.29

Other
Protestant

.09
.02

Conservative
Women

--

--

--

.01

.03

1.01

VC
.03

SD
.17

VC
.03

SD
.16

VC
.03

SD
.17

---

---

---

---

---

---

-.07

-.27

-.11

-.33

-.09

-.3

*

.12
--

.35
--

**

.26
--

.51
--

**

.28
--

.53
--

***

.31
.13

*

.05
--

.22
--

*

.05
--

.22
--

**

.07
--

.27
--

**

.
.01

.02
.11

+

.
.01

.02
.1

*
*

.
.01

.02
.1

*
*

.
.01

.01
.09

*
*

Age
Subjective Social Class

.
.01

.01
.08

**
+

.
--

.01
--

***

.
--

.
--

***

.
.01

.
.07

***
**

Urban
Confidence in Gov't
Institutions

.05

.21

*

.04

.2

*

.04

.19

**

.03

.16

**

.02

.14

--

--

--

--

--

--

.01
.03

.12
.16

---

---

---

---

---

---

.04

.19

--

--

--

--

--

--

.05
.11

.21
.33

---

---

---

---

---

---

Confidence in the
Environmental Movement
Some Primary Education
Some Secondary
Education
Completed Secondary
Education
Some College Education

+

+

*

**

**
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Completed College
Education
Income

.14
.

.37
.05

**

---

---

---

---

-.

-.05

***

*** p < .001
**p < .01
* p < .05
+ p < 0.1
Religion Reference = "no religious preference"
Education Reference = "no formal education"
Level-1 N = 34,555
Level-2 N = 27
Data Sources: Level-1 data come from the 1999-2001 World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). Level-2 data come from the 2000 Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) and from the 2000 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)
(http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/).
Level-2 variance components indicate that Model 1 explains 84% of the level-2 variance, Model 3 explains 81% of the level-2 variance, and Model 4 explains 82% of
the level-2 variance.
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Figure 5.3: Graph of Predicted Values of Willingness to Sacrifice for Religious
Affiliation by World-System Position Interaction
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Figure 5.4: Graph of Predicted Values of Willingness to Sacrifice for Gender by WorldSystem Position Interaction
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Figure 5.5: Graph of Predicted Values of Willingness to Sacrifice for Education by
World-System Position Interaction
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Figure 5.6: Graph of Predicted Values of Economic Tradeoffs for Religious Affiliation
by World-System Position Interaction
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Figure 5.7: Graph of Predicted Values of Economic Tradeoffs for Confidence in
Government Institutions and Confidence in the Environmental Movement by WorldSystem Position Interaction
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